

# SIX YEARS LATER (PART II): INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISTS

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT  
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 14, 2008

**Serial No. 110-183**

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>  
<http://www.oversight.house.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

51-567 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2009

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## **SIX YEARS LATER (PART III): INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISTS**

**THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS,  
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Yarmuth, Van Hollen, Welch, Duncan, and Marchant.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy Wright, professional staff member; Christopher Bright and Janice Specter, minority professional staff members; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel; Mark Lavin, minority Army fellow; Todd Greenwood, minority legislative assistant; and Jeanne Neal, minority intern.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank all of you for coming here this morning. I also want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us this morning, for all preparation in advance and sharing your opening statements with us as well.

A quorum is present, so the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, "Six Years Later (Part III): Innovative Approaches to Combating Terrorists," will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, that is so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee can be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, that is so ordered.

I am going to start with a brief opening statement on the record. Mr. Marchant will also have the opportunity to present one as well. Then we will go to questions, 5-minute rounds of each of the witnesses. Some of you have testified before, and you know the drill. We will be as lenient as we can be on the 5-minutes without going too far along. We would like to get to some questions and answers. I think that is the best way to elicit information.

Before we start today, I want to take just one moment to have a moment of silence for our friend and colleague, Tom Lantos, who not only was a member of the full Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform, but also was a member of this subcommittee. He had an incredibly distinguished service in Congress for many, many years, including as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee as well. He also served as ranking member for many years and had an admirable life. If we could just take one moment, a moment of silence, please.

[Moment of silence observed.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Tom Lantos always had such a record on human rights. I think one of the pleasures of being in Congress is being around somebody like that, that comes with such passion from their heart to stand up and address the floor on those issues. I hope that we can do no better honor to him than having a good hearing this morning and get the information I know he would have wanted people to become aware of.

This hearing marks our third in a series of hearings focused on long-term U.S. national security strategy more than 6 years after September 11th.

We are very fortunate to have such a distinguished group of witnesses here this morning. They are on the cutting edge of understanding the best way to deal with Al Qaeda or other groups associated with terrorists, as we move forward.

Since September 11, 2001, we have struggled to develop a coherent and effective national security strategy to defeat the global jihadist movement that is most closely symbolized by Al Qaeda but certainly not restricted to them.

Notwithstanding the U.S.' counter-terrorism efforts, the lives lost, and the vast amounts of resources and money expended, our intelligence community recently reported an alarming resurgence and strengthening of Al Qaeda. A July 2007 national intelligence estimate stated very clearly that Al Qaeda had "protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership."

These are troubling findings, obviously, and they were reaffirmed just last week in congressional testimony by Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, and General Michael Hayden, the Director of Central Intelligence. According to Director McConnell, Al Qaeda is "gaining strength from its refuge in Pakistan and is steadily improving its ability to recruit, train and position operatives capable of carrying out attacks inside the United States."

One of the most constructive roles this oversight committee can play in this generational struggle is to continuously assess performance and strategy and to explore emergent thinking and analysis in combating international terrorism.

The cold war called on us to bring forth the best innovators from every segment of society. The same effort has been lacking, unfortunately, since September 11th. Over these last years, I have been critical, and I think others have as well, of the administration for its failure to fully engage the public, including our wealth of resources among academic researchers, international business people, non-governmental organizations, educators and technical leaders, in this vital effort.

Our country's strength has always been characterized by our unique mix of optimism, pragmatism, creativity, work ethic and true grit that has led to our great engine of innovation. And now we need to focus this ingenuity squarely on the task of defeating Al Qaeda and other terrorists. Today we will try to highlight some of the best of this emergent thinking and analysis.

First, unlike the cold war, do we not face a threat posed by a competing superpower. Instead, we are fighting loose networks of terrorist cells willing to fight unconventional warfare, including declaring open season on civilians. Today, based on documents captured on the battlefield, we will explore sophisticated analyses of the potential vulnerabilities of Al Qaeda's networked organizational structure.

Second, Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and copycats thrive in environments with the absence of government as well as sympathetic local populations. We have spent several hearings focused on the troubling phenomenon in Pakistan's tribal ares, and today we will more fully explore the nature of these ungoverned spaces and the best way to drain these swamps.

Third, Al Qaeda and the other jihadists benefit from widespread anti-Western sentiment across the Muslim world. Despite increased resources on public diplomacy in the Muslim world, poll after poll continues to show abysmal levels of anti-American sentiment. Today we will explore new approaches in thinking on how best to fight the war of ideas in the Muslim world.

I look forward to engaging in this enlightening—and overdue—discussion. Again, I welcome and thank our witnesses and ask Mr. Marchant if he would care to make an opening statement.

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for continuing the examination of our national strategies.

As you know, this subcommittee has been investigating U.S. national security strategies since 2001. I am pleased that we are continuing this important work, and focusing now on the public enemy No. 1: Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden's organization, Al Qaeda, existed before September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, prior to that fateful day, the U.S. Government did not have an adequate terrorist threat assessment or a coordinated strategy to deal with the threat, and our Government was not properly organized to counter terrorism.

We are still locked in a war against a fanatical enemy, 6 years and 5 months from the day which defined our generation. Our brave men and women are in harm's way and are deployed around the world, trying to prevent further attacks on our Nation. We thank them and their families for their sacrifice.

One of our greatest Presidents, Ronald Reagan, understood extremists such as Al Qaeda. He knew they had political goals and strategic ambitions. President Clinton believed terrorism to be a law enforcement matter. After September 11, 2001, the United States decided to confront terrorism and engage in a combat against those who oppose peace and security. This was the day we placed our military on the front lines.

The facts show that we have been doing something right. Has it been perfect? No. Can more be done and changes be made to adapt and confront these fanatics? Absolutely. It has been said repeat-

edly, we must get more than our military involved. We need to accelerate the diplomatic effort and consider every consequence before committing U.S. forces to combat.

This subcommittee has held multiple hearings that explored the development of a comprehensive strategy to address the security threats that we face as a Nation. We have heard frequently that we rely too much on military power, and have neglected traditional instruments of soft power. Today, we will hear how to focus these efforts against such known enemy organizations. We will hear how to combat terrorist organizations in order to exploit weakness.

What we will see is that their weakness is neither easily measured nor exploitable with military might alone. Our enemies can and will be defeated. It will take time and dedication, but we will prevail. As we have seen in Iraq, the world will rebel against Al Qaeda for their brutality and lack of restraint against innocent people in all countries. As reported yesterday, the U.S. military's strict rules of engagement underscore a sharp contrast between its conduct and that of Al Qaeda.

The American soldier carries the banner of freedom for the United States. General Petraeus' spokesman said this plainly 2 days ago when he asked, "where else do we see a soldier, sailor, airman or marine fight incredibly hard 1 minute and then show the greatest depths of compassion the next, against those they are trying to protect as well as those they have just fought against?"

History has shown the world that the United States offers the idea that everyone is bestowed with inalienable rights. The protection of these rights rests with the government of the people. The specifics of the structure of the government must be determined by the people and unique to their culture. A government must protect the rights of its people and the sovereignty of its neighbors. In such a world, in which free people choose their governments under a blanket of security, there is no place for extremism and an organization like Al Qaeda.

With this in mind, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony from our distinguished witnesses and thank each of them for being here today.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Marchant.

I would like to begin by introducing our witnesses. Today we welcome Colonel Michael J. Meese, or Dr. Meese, whichever he prefers, Professor and Head of the Social Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Colonel Meese is also co-author of "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al Qaeda's Organizational Vulnerabilities," published by West Point's Combating Terrorism Center.

Angel Rabasa, Ph.D., senior policy analyst at the RAND Corp. and co-author of "Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks."

Amitai Etzioni, a Ph.D. as well, University professor at George Washington University and author most recently of "Security First for a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy."

And Dr. Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University. Professor Byman is also a former staff member of the 9/11 Commission and author

of the recently published book, "The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad."

I want to welcome all of you good doctors with us here this morning. It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear all our witnesses before you testify, so I will ask you to please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please reflect that all indicated in the affirmative.

Again, we ask you to keep your statements, if you can, reasonably to within 5 minutes. I had the opportunity last night to read your statements, and I can't imagine that most of those statements would be done in 5 minutes. So you might try to give us a little synthesis of that, if you would. We would love to get some questions in as well.

Dr. Meese, why don't we start with you.

**STATEMENTS OF COLONEL MICHAEL J. MEESE, PH.D., PROFESSOR AND HEAD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT AT THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT; ANGEL RABASA, PH.D., SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORP.; AMITAI ETZIONI, PH.D., UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY; AND DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY**

**STATEMENT OF COLONEL MICHAEL J. MEESE**

Colonel MEESE. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney, Representative Marchant, distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor for me to be here to address this important topic, and I will try to summarize my statement and ask that it be put into the record.

Within the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has a unique, critical and innovative approach to understanding, teaching and contributing to terrorism policy. I should note that, while I am proud to represent the Center, our new distinguished Chair, General Retired John Abizaid, who now works at West Point, I should note that these remarks are my own and not necessarily those of the Army or any other agency of Government.

While some have said that this war against Al Qaeda and other terrorists is new, and old lessons don't apply, in reality I think there are many aspects of this war that are very similar. For example, the President said, "We face a hostile ideology, global in scope, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration." While that could have been President Bush talking about Al Qaeda, it was actually President Eisenhower describing the communist threat.

As Eisenhower was President when the last long war started, it is important to recognize four key similarities with the current struggle against Al Qaeda. First, as was mentioned in both of the opening statements, this is not just a military war. Like the cold war, it is also, and perhaps more importantly, intellectual and ideological. Second, it is absolutely essential that we understand the

enemy. Third, as in the cold war, it will take all of the resources of this Nation to engage with the enemy, not just the Armed Forces.

That is where the Combating Terrorism Center comes in. We are both a military and an academic institution. We can play and have played a critical role linking academics that may or may not be willing participants supporting the kinds of causes that the Government does as well as military organizations that are not used to working with academic institutions. I like to call that linking the dot.mil address with the dot.edu addresses.

Fourth, we must concentrate our efforts against the core of the enemy, the ideas of the radical jihadists that enable Al Qaeda to spread even after its leaders are captured or killed. With this brief description of the war as I see it, let me now describe what we are doing to engage in a strategic and intellectual war against terrorists. We have employed some of the best experts in academia to study Al Qaeda's own writings. We are truly trying to do what the title of one of our first publications said, steal Al Qaeda's playbook by reading what they have written.

We also leveraged the great repository of information that has been captured from terrorists. Captured documents in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Harmony database. By linking the intelligence finds on the battlefield with the academic scholars, we can understand the enemy, identify the weaknesses and its organization and ideology and expose its hateful, extremist world view.

Our Harmony series of reports, which several of you have, and you see before you, includes in the first part of it, our analysis in part 1, which is a very good academic argument with lots of footnotes and that kind of thing. What is more important is part 2, where we actually present the captured documents in English and Arabic forms, so that other scholars from other academia can engage and study those documents and propel the intellectual study of terrorism forward.

I have references to the specific documents in my testimony and I would encourage anybody who's interested in them to go to our Web site, [ctc.usma.edu](http://ctc.usma.edu). We have found that "a" is very frank in their documents and candid about their strengths and vulnerabilities. By reading them, we have great success. Last May, we had an unlikely confirmation that we were effective from actually Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda, when he released his video tapes. Hopefully, this will play and I will speak over the tape just a little.

[Video shown.]

Colonel MEESE. This is Zawahiri's video tape. He actually cropped our symbol from our Web site and is reading from one of our reports where we talked about strategies to encourage moderate, mainstream Salafis. He decries what we are saying to do.

He is citing it, the graphics are actually very good, too. So what we see is the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda reading our writings. That is a good indication, the fact that this subcommittee is reading our writings is also a good indication. And as we see it, if more people in and out of Government can take a look at what Al Qaeda is saying for themselves, we will all be better off and understand them better.

Thanks to farsighted West Point graduates like Vinnie Viola, George Gilmore and others whose private funding established the Combating Terrorism Center and those in Special Operations Command who support our research, we have been able to understand, analyze and ultimately counter the ideology of Al Qaeda. Douglas MacArthur told the Corps of Cadets at West Point that their mission is to win our Nation's wars. At the Combating Terrorism Center, we strive to link the scholars and the warriors to understand terrorists and exploit that knowledge to help defeat the enemy.

We will continue to do everything that we can to equip our graduates so that they will always be able to win our Nation's wars.

I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Meese follows:]

STATEMENT BY

COLONEL MICHAEL J. MEESE, PHD,  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
PROFESSOR AND HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, NEW YORK

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY & FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

SIX YEARS LATER (PART III): INNOVATIVE APPROACHES  
TO COMBATING TERRORISTS

FEBRUARY 14, 2008

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE ON  
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES

## STATEMENT BY

COLONEL MICHAEL J. MEESE, PHD, UNITED STATES ARMY  
PROFESSOR AND HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, NEW YORK  
"INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISTS"

Chairman Tierney, Representative Shays, Distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor for me to provide testimony to you on the topic of "Innovative Approaches To Combating Terrorists." Next week, in my Department—the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, we will celebrate the 5<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the establishment of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, which has a unique, critical, and innovative approach to understanding, teaching, and contributing to terrorism policy. On behalf of our Distinguished Chair, General (retired) John Abizaid, and the many faculty members who work with us, I am happy to discuss this topic because we are passionate about it and appreciate your Committee's interest in it. While I am proud to represent the Center, I should note that these remarks are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Military Academy, the Army, or any other agency of government.

**Characteristics of this War**

We have studied war at West Point since our founding in 1802. While some have said the war against al-Qa'ida and other terrorists is new and old lessons don't apply, in reality, I think that many aspects of this war are similar. For example, the President said: **"We face a hostile ideology-global in scope. . . ruthless in purpose and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration."** While that could have been President Bush describing al-Qa'ida, it was actually President Eisenhower in his farewell address in 1961 describing the communist threat. As Eisenhower was president when that last long war started, it is important to recognize four key similarities with the current struggle against al-Qa'ida.

First, the war is not just a military war. Like the Cold War, it is also and perhaps more importantly, **intellectual and ideological**. It is not possible to capture, kill, or incarcerate ideas. We should not think of al-Qa`ida in terms of organizational charts and bureaucratic hierarchies that typify a conventional military enemy. Al-Qa`ida has become a brand name, a way of seeing the world, a vision for what they see as the future, which contrasts starkly from both what Americans believe and what "mainstream" Islamists believe.

Second, it is absolutely essential for the United States to **understand the enemy** in this war. At West Point, we are very familiar with Sun Tzu's maxim stressing the critical importance of knowing your enemy. In this war, the enemy has often been characterized as the hostile ideology responsible for extremist Islamic radicalism. We must continue to develop a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of this ideology and what is driving it.

Third, as in the Cold War, it will take **all of the resources of this nation** to engage with the enemy—not just the resources of our Armed Forces. The U.S. comparative advantage is not just its great military, but **its great thinkers**—many of whom can be more productively engaged from civilian academe. When I was a cadet at West Point, I studied the Soviet Union and there were entire Departments of Sovietology spread throughout universities. Libraries were filled with the books on Soviet politics, military, and ideology and robust debates in and out of the government helped our understanding of the enemy. Many of these programs were supported by grants and funding by this Congress and it made a significant difference. We need a similarly sophisticated engagement with academia today so that all of the forces of the nation can be used in this war.

This is where the unique role of the Combating Terrorism Center comes in. As **both a military and academic institution**, all of our people have security clearances and are comfortable working with military and other government

agencies. At the same time all of our people are accomplished scholars who are equally comfortable at academic conferences engaging in the dynamic exchange of ideas. The Combating Terrorism Center plays a critical role bridging those with dot-mil (.mil) addresses with those with dot-edu (.edu) addresses.

Fourth, as we understand the enemy, it is important to **concentrate our efforts against the core** of that enemy. Just as all of the people under the control of the USSR were not our enemy, we have found that it is a relatively small and isolated group of extremists that are irreconcilable in this global insurgency. A small subset of radical extremists Jihadis are the enemy that we should focus on.

I spent the better part of 6 months last year in Iraq working for General Petraeus in Iraq. Part of the Multinational Force-Iraq strategy to identify and target irreconcilable elements while working assiduously to reconcile with those who can support the government. In a global counterinsurgency against al-Qa'ida, the real center of gravity is the ideas of radical Jihadist thought that enables the al-Qa'ida to spread even as its leaders are captured or killed. Reconcilable Islamists may not necessarily like the United States or everything that we stand for, but they are people who turn away from the vitriolic hatred of the extreme Jihadis and join "mainstream" Muslims to constructively engage in economic, political, and social relations.

To sum up, in his testimony in September, General Petraeus said we will not, "kill our way out of this war," but in fact we are working for a political and indeed ideological solution to the war in Iraq. Similarly, in the persistent conflict against terrorists, **we cannot kill our way out of it**. We need to recognize that it is an ideological struggle, we must work hard to understand the enemy, we must leverage all of the governmental and academic resources against it, and we must combine all of this knowledge to isolate and delegitimize the minority subset of irreconcilable extremist jihadis and their radical thinking.

### **What We Have Done**

Recognizing the importance of understanding the enemy and focusing on the thinking of the radical Jihadis, we focused the Combating Terrorism Center's research on the writing of the Jihadis themselves. This has come in two forms.

First, **we have concentrated on studying al-Qa'ida's own writings.** Because of our successful military operations in Afghanistan, al-Qa'ida no longer has a secure base to operate from—so they have turned to the virtual world of the internet to educate, unite, clarify, and discuss their policies. Many of the Jihadi Movement's most important books and papers are housed on a website that serves as al-Qa'ida's on-line library of over 3,000 books and articles.<sup>1</sup> These texts have been downloaded tens-of-thousands of times and have been found in the possession of both dead and aspiring terrorists. For example, the Madrid train bombers had more than 50 of electronic books we studied on their computers.

By reading these texts, we can gain great understanding about what al-Qa'ida thinks, who its leading thinkers are, and what they are saying to each other. The title of one of our first publications, by Jarret Brachman and Will McCants, is **"Stealing al-Qa'ida's playbook."** That is exactly what we are doing by reading their ideology, understanding their strategy, and then proposing policies to counter it.

Second, **there is a great repository of information that has been captured** on the battlefield from al-Qa'ida and other terrorists. These are kept in a database, established by the Defense Intelligence Agency, called "Harmony." We have been given some of these documents after they were declassified and translated. By reading, understanding, and exploiting that information, we can link the intelligence finds of the war with the academic scholars who can help us understand the enemy, identify the weaknesses in its organization and ideology, and expose its hateful, extremist worldview that is antithetical to mainstream thought.

This process has led to what we call the **Harmony series of reports**. We study the documents we have been given and then publish Harmony report in two parts: First, Part 1 is a detailed academic report citing the documents and putting them in context. Second, Part 2, which is arguably more important, is that **we release all of the documents** in their complete English and Arabic versions so that other researchers can download the original documents and make their own conclusions. This is where our “academic” or .edu role comes in. We encourage peer review, disagreement, and argument over our conclusions. Our objective is not to necessarily have people agree with us, but to encourage others to study and understand the actual documents of the enemy so that they advance the knowledge of al-Qa’ida and devise creative ways to defeat them.

This only other organization that does this unclassified release of documents in a robust way is the **Open Source Center**, established by the DNI and CIA. Whatever you can do to support the translation and release enemy documents and other material, will provide great insights that can significantly help all of us understand who we are fighting and how to counter their ideological hatred.

I have references in the text to all of our reports and would encourage anyone who is interested in reading them to go to our website: <http://ctc.usma.edu/>. To briefly summarize, we have found from al-Qa’ida’s own documents that **they are extremely candid about their strengths and vulnerabilities**. They do after action reviews of their actions and identify their problems, fissures, internal divisions, and specific disputes. If we understand their writings we can better leverage all of the resources to exploit those vulnerabilities.

From the **“Harmony and Disharmony”** report,<sup>2</sup> LTC Joe Felter found that al-Qa’ida faces significant organizational problems, including pay, contract disputes, conflicts among workers and managers, and the difficulty of monitoring implementation of specific al-Qa’ida policies. From the **“MisAdventures in the Horn of Africa”** report,<sup>3</sup> we found that al-Qa’ida had particular challenges in

ungoverned spaces, such as Somalia, where local warlords were not likely to tolerate outsiders and there was no weak government for them to coerce or intimidate. In the "**Cracks in the Foundation**" report,<sup>4</sup> Vahid Brown found that al-Qa'ida leaders have generally emerged into two factions—one committed to building an effective, organized guerrilla fighting force and another focused on establishing al-Qa'ida as a global brand that focused on ideological appeal to all fighting in a violent resistance. Finally, in the "**Foreign Fighters in Iraq**" report,<sup>5</sup> Joe Felter and Brian Fishman analyzed nearly 700 captured individual foreign fighters records, complete with pictures, phone numbers, hometowns, and other data. By analyzing and publishing this information, we not only provided a contemporary, data-driven look at who comprises foreign fighters in Iraq, but dozens of academics and news organizations around the world have picked up the story and are continuing the research into those who would support extremist jihadi causes.

As an academic, although we have had thousands of downloads from all over the world, you sometimes never know if you are on the right track with your work and your reports. Last May, we had an unlikely confirmation that we were effective from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two leader in al-Qa'ida, in one of his video tapes. In one of our papers, we had discussed specific strategies that would support reconcilable, mainstream Salafi figures and Zawahiri actually read from the CTC's own report in his video message, citing the CTC's recommendations it as something that they must counter. (Show Zawahiri video).

What we have learned in the past five years is that we don't have all of the answers, but that we can, through leveraging the resources of both the government, and, especially, scholars in the academic community, to **understand, analyze, and ultimately counter the ideology of al-Qa'ida**. Thanks to the far-sighted West Point graduates such as Vinnie Viola, George Gilmore, and others whose private funding established the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and the efforts of individuals in Special Operations Command to support our

research into better understanding al-Qa'ida, we believe that we are making a difference.

Douglas MacArthur during his farewell address in 1962 told the Corps of Cadets "Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolate—it is to win our nation's wars." This maxim is just as true today. At the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, we strive to link the scholars and the warriors—the intellectuals and the operators—to understand the enemy and exploit that knowledge to help defeat the enemy. The cadets that I teach will graduate in just over 100 days and soon be serving our nation at war. This gives us focus to our critically important mission of equipping West Point graduates with the best intellectual skills possible so that they are prepared to face this enemy, which they will confront throughout their careers.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward to answering your questions.

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<sup>1</sup> In 2006, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point used this library to map the Jihadi Movement's most influential ideologues. The results are now available online: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas.asp>.

<sup>2</sup> See "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities," available at: <http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq.asp>.

<sup>3</sup> Al-Qai'da's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa," available at: <http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp>.

<sup>4</sup> See "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida from 1989-2006," available at: <http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp>.

<sup>5</sup> See "Al-Qai'da's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records," <http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf>.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Colonel.  
Dr. Rabasa, would you please give us a statement as well?

**STATEMENT OF ANGEL RABASA**

Mr. RABASA. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank you, the ranking member and the subcommittee, for inviting me to testify at this hearing. The subject of my presentation is the security problems posed by ungoverned territories and what could be done to address them.

This is a subject of a RAND Corp. study that came out recently. It is summarized in my written testimony. Ungoverned territories have also been a troublesome feature of the international landscape. They generate all manner of security problems such as civil conflict, humanitarian crisis, arms and drug smuggling, piracy and refugee flows. They threaten regional stability and security and generate demands on scarce military resources.

After September 11th, we have also become aware of the potential of ungoverned territories to become terrorist sanctuaries, as acknowledged by the September 11th Commission's report, to which my friend and former RAND colleague Dan Byman was a major contributor. Ungoverned territories are a common feature of the international landscape, but not all of them become terrorist sanctuaries. So in our study, we analyzed the factors that make some regions more conducive to a terrorist presence than others. We found that a key requirement is the existence of a level of infrastructure that allows terrorist groups to perform certain basic functions, such as money transfers, personnel movements and so on.

To the extent that a territory lacks this basic infrastructure, it is difficult for terrorist groups to organize and execute attacks. So there is a certain tension between this need to operate in a region that can sustain a certain operations tempo and the need to hide from the authorities and the international security agencies. Equally important factors include a base of support among the population, willing, of course, social or cultural norms that can be exploited by terrorists, sources of income and in many cases, strategic alliances with criminal networks.

Based on our analysis of eight case studies across four continents, we found that ungoverned territories can be classified, broadly speaking, into three types, what we call cases of contested, incomplete and abdicated governance. In cases of contested governance, local forces, insurgents, terrorists or whatever, they actively dispute government control of a region in order to create their own state-like entity.

In other places, we find incomplete governance. This is where governments lack the resources and competencies to project effective rule into a region. In other words, the central government may have the political will, but not the capabilities or resources to establish control. Some parts of Central America and Eastern Indonesia fall into this category.

In the third category, abdicated governance, the central government abdicates its responsibility for marginal provinces and regions. In some cases, these authorities might conclude that extending control to certain peripheral areas is not cost-effective. Or these areas could be populated by ethnic minorities with whom the cen-

tral government shares little affinity, for instance, the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Each of these three types of ungoverned territories requires a different set of policy remedies that address the fundamental sources of the lack of governance. For instance, in cases of incomplete governance where the central government has the political will but not the means to extend its control, policies emphasizing official development assistance, foreign direct investment and institutional reform are the best choices.

In cases of abdicated governance, the effective approach would be to create incentives for the central government to establish a state presence. This assumes that the central government wants to increase the capacity of the state institutions. If, on the other hand, the governing style and methods of the ruling group are at the root of the problem, for instance, in the case of the Sudanese government actions in Darfur, then support for the group in power would be counterproductive.

Where contested rule is the source of the trouble, a decision has to be made on either supporting the incumbent government or not. And that depends on a number of criteria, such as the strength and representativeness of the government and of the parties contesting its influence, the links of the opposition to international terrorism, if any, the effectiveness of the government response and what is the desired outcome from a U.S. perspective. A decision to support the government might lead to policies of counter-insurgency, foreign military assistance and financing and similar options.

If on the other hand the central government is fighting a movement with substantial popular support and legitimacy, a negotiations track might be the best option. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front insurgency in Mindanao is an obvious case in point.

The RAND study identifies more specific policy recommendations that address in detail these two sides of the question, first, what measures could be taken to help friendly governments expand their presence in ungoverned territories, and second, what steps could be taken to make it more difficult for terrorist groups to entrench themselves in these areas. The bottom line is that in our national strategy and defense planning, ungoverned territories need to be considered a distinct category of security problems and not a lesser included case of other challenges.

By and large, we do not have the policy instruments optimized to deal with problems of ungoverned territory or we do not have these instruments in sufficient numbers. I would be happy to elaborate on any of these points in the question and answer period.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rabasa follows:]

## TESTIMONY

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# Ungoverned Territories

ANGEL RABASA

CT-299

February 2008

Testimony presented before the House Oversight and Government Reform  
Committee, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs on  
February 14, 2008

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Angel Rabasa<sup>1</sup>  
The RAND Corporation

*Ungoverned Territories*<sup>2</sup>

**Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
Subcommittee on the National Security and Foreign Affairs  
United States House of Representatives**

**February 14, 2008**

I would like to thank Chairman John Tierney and the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives for inviting me to testify at this hearing. The subject of my presentation is the security problems posed by ungoverned territories, and what could be done to address them, which is the subject of a RAND Corporation Project AIR FORCE report, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*.<sup>3</sup>

Ungoverned territories have always been a troublesome feature of the international landscape. They generate all manner of security problems, such as civil conflict and humanitarian crises, arms and drug smuggling, piracy, and refugee flows. They threaten regional stability and security and generate demands on scarce military resources. Many of the crises that have required intervention by U.S. or international forces since the end of the Cold War were produced by the collapse or absence of state authority. Nevertheless, with the exception of humanitarian crises, ungoverned territories were of relatively little interest to the U.S. national security community, unless, like the coca-growing areas of South America during the 1990s "war on drugs," they generated problems for the United States that required some degree of involvement.

9/11 changed this calculus by demonstrating how terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies. In the post-9/11 world, national security experts are coming to the consensus that threats to U.S. security may arise from areas within states or at the boundaries between states that, for various reasons, are not controlled by a central authority.

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<sup>1</sup> The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

<sup>2</sup> This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT299/>.

<sup>3</sup> Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Kevin A. O'Brien, and John E. Peters, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the front lines of the war on terrorism lie in these ungoverned territories.

Despite the increased urgency of dealing with the threats emanating from ungoverned territories, the United States and other members of the international community have not proven adept in developing effective responses. One reason for this is that the phenomenon of ungoverned territories is poorly understood. In order to develop more effective policies—or at least to understand the limitations of the tools at the disposal of the United States and other nations and organizations in dealing with this problem—it is necessary to examine the factors that give rise to ungoverned territories, to identify their salient characteristics, and on this basis to distinguish among different types of ungoverned territories.

Unpacking this phenomenon, the objective of our study, yields insights that have important implications for counterterrorism policy. They provide a basis for assessing the effectiveness and relevance of existing policies and programs and serve as a guide to develop strategies to improve the ability of the United States and its friends and allies to mitigate the effects of ungoverned territories as breeding grounds for terrorism and criminal activities.

#### **What are ungoverned territories?**

The term “ungoverned territories” does not imply the complete absence of power structures in the territories in question. We mean that, in these regions, the state is absent, unable, or unwilling to perform its functions.

Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders or airspace, or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not extend. Ungoverned territories can thus be found along a continuum of state control. At the benign end of the continuum are otherwise healthy states that have lost control of some geographic or functional space within their territories. For instance, a state that otherwise functions reasonably well could be plagued with a high level of illegal immigration across poorly controlled borders and the presence of criminal gangs involved in that activity. At the other end of the spectrum are failed states, in which the institutions of the central government are so weak that they cannot maintain authority or political or social order beyond their capitals.

In developing the methodology for an examination of ungoverned territories, we enter somewhat of an analytical terra incognita. There is a literature about failed states and civil conflict, and various analysts and policymakers have referred to ungoverned territories as a security problem.

But there has been no concerted effort to define and analyze ungoverned territories as a separate and unique category of security challenges. The first step in this analysis is to identify the characteristics of ungoverned territories.

### **Characteristics of Ungoverned Territories**

The first characteristic of an ungoverned territory is the lack of penetration by state institutions into the general society. A lack of state penetration could be measured by absent or nonfunctioning state institutions. For example, law enforcement entities may only be present in the capital or major cities of a state, leaving substantial territory outside the state's purview. Health and welfare institutions may not reach into a substantial portion of the state's rural areas or inner cities. This lack of presence allows other organizations to take precedence in determining the rules of everyday life. Thus, individuals may look to warlords, mullahs, or tribal leaders rather than state agencies for judicial processes. Or insurgent groups may offer the only health care or other social services available to the population.

The lack of state penetration is also reflected in low compliance with existing laws. In an ungoverned territory, the state is not the primary source of authority. It is no more likely to be perceived as legitimate than competing power centers or to be able to elicit compliance with its laws. Indeed, the state is simply one actor within an ecosystem in which many groups and entities interact with each other and evolve through adaptation to changes in the environment. In this situation, a "survival of the fittest" dynamic emerges. The state's ability to reassert control depends on the health of whatever state institutions—particularly judicial and law enforcement—may be present, and whether those institutions have been subverted by corruption or competing local allegiances.

Aside from the overarching issue of the presence, or lack thereof, of state institutions in ungoverned territories, there are physical and social factors that contribute to the emergence of ungoverned territories. An important factor is inaccessibility. Ungoverned territories are often found in difficult terrain: mountains, jungles, or desert. These areas are generally economically marginal and sparsely populated conditions that retard economic development and diminish the state's incentives to develop the infrastructure necessary to maintain a robust state presence. In the globalized world, however, inaccessibility is a relative concept. Even where physical infrastructure is least developed, there are options for travel and communications. Nevertheless, especially in states with weak administrative structures, such limited infrastructure might actually aggravate governance problems because anti-state forces can use it for their own purposes.

Corruption is endemic in most, if not all, of the cases we considered. This corruption is structural, not just a question of corrupt individuals, and it reflects the low level of income of officials, the cultural norms that require them to take care of subordinates and relatives, and the resulting need to raise money in unconventional ways. Widespread corruption delegitimizes the state and may have severe security consequences.

A weak state presence, inaccessibility, the lack of physical infrastructure, and corruption and misgovernment can be more easily overcome than social and cultural resistance to state penetration of society, where a large part of the populace disputes the legitimacy of the state and its institutions and prefers to have other entities—ethnic groups, clans, tribes, or extended families—serve as the basis for social, judicial, and political organization. In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), the Pashtun tribes have a long history of resistance to outside authority and a distinct legal and administrative system dating back to colonial times. The Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao, commonly known as Moros or Bangsamoro (the Moro nation) have contested the authority of the Manila government and its religious and cultural influence since the Spanish colonial period. Likewise, in the North Caucasus there has been a history of resistance to Russian domination on the part of the Chechens and other Caucasian peoples.

The presence of armed groups outside the state's control is a primary indicator of the extent to which a territory is ungoverned. The activities of illegal groups, particularly when they are trafficking in a lucrative and socially destructive commodity such as cocaine, tend to weaken and corrupt political and social institutions. To the extent that these groups are successful, they also displace state and government institutions—usually weak to begin with—in the areas where they establish a foothold. Unchecked, illegal armed groups will expand their resource base, increase their recruiting pool, and generate greater capacity at the expense of the state. Such groups also threaten individual citizens, requiring them to pay “taxes” or protection money or compelling them to participate in illegal activities. These actions further weaken the state because citizens come to view the state as ineffective or irrelevant.

In some cases, these armed groups are full-blown insurgent movements with thousands of fighters—for instance, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao (MILF), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (which is now part of a coalition government in Khartoum), The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and Somali militias. At times, these groups have actively contested control of territory against government forces. Other groups, such as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in Central America, are gangs without a particular ideology or political agenda that are nevertheless destructive of public order.

The presence of criminal networks also represents an intrusion on the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of force. In numerous cases, terrorist or insurgent groups develop opportunistic alliances with these networks. This convergence may be facilitated by similar logistical and operational requirements and synergies produced by sharing a common infrastructure, e.g., airfields, logistical corridors, safe havens, and financial and money laundering networks. Even where this convergence of insurgency or terrorism with crime has not occurred, there seems to be a feedback mechanism in which the activities of criminal groups in turn create greater social disorder which facilitates the terrorists' work of subversion. The prototypical case of the convergence of crime and insurgency is, of course, Colombia, where over the past two decades the FARC, a Marxist guerrilla force that has operated in the backlands of Colombia since the 1960s, has emerged as a narco-guerrilla group, deeply involved at various stages in the cocaine trade, from which it derives about half of its income.

Widespread access to weapons also represents competition with the state over the legitimate use of force. It is no accident that many ungoverned territories are awash in arms. The Yemeni Interior Ministry estimates that the country's approximately 19 million people own some 50 million personal weapons. In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan there is an entrenched "Kalashnikov culture" that extends beyond adults to teenagers and even children.

There is a high correlation between the lack of border controls and the existence of ungoverned territories. Border areas are spaces with unique characteristics that present unique problems—issues of functional cooperation among neighboring states, for instance. In theory, borders mark the interface between nation-states; they serve as functional barriers where states control the transnational movement of people and goods. In practice, borders are also gateways through which insurgent and terrorist groups trade resources and receive critical inputs. In many cases, they are areas in which weak states are least likely to exercise effective control. Regulating cross-border movements by individuals with tribe, clan, or family ties on both sides of the border is particularly problematic. This is the case with the Pashtun tribesmen in FATA, many of whom do not respect the Durand Line that formally marks the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In some situations, an external power, usually a neighboring state or its proxies exerts control or influence over the domestic political and economic space within another state or prevents the latter government from asserting control over that space. This interference could be direct, as in the case of Rwandan military incursions into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or it could be carried out by local proxies or allies or by a combination of both, for instance, Syria and Iran in Lebanon or Russia in the Caucasus. External states can also take subtler, sub rosa actions,

backing preferred local candidates and officials and undermining others, or through networks informally associated with the state.

### **The Problem of Terrorist Sanctuaries**

Ungoverned territories occur throughout the world, but not all ungoverned territories become terrorist sanctuaries. Beyond the natural tendency of terrorist or insurgent groups to operate in their home areas, there are several factors that influence the extent to which territories are conducive to the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups: adequacy of infrastructure and operational access; availability of sources of income; favorable demographic and social characteristics; and invisibility—the ability of terrorists and insurgents to blend into the population and escape detection by the authorities.

A key requirement of a terrorist operational base is the existence of an infrastructure that allows terrorist groups to perform basic functions. The elements of such an infrastructure include communications facilities; an official or unofficial banking system that allows for the transfer of funds; and a transportation network that provides access to urban centers and potential external targets. There is a certain tension between the terrorists' requirements for invisibility and for operational effectiveness. To the extent that a territory lacks the basic infrastructure required for government surveillance, terrorists can move around with impunity. But if the territory is so undeveloped that terrorists cannot communicate, move funds, or travel from remote locations to urban areas, it will be difficult for them to organize and execute attacks.

Al-Qaeda's sanctuary in the FATA, for instance, has few paved roads and rudimentary public transport, but it is possible to travel from urban centers in Pakistan to points along the Afghan border, and vice versa, by train, bus, automobile, and minivan. Completely ungoverned territories lacking even those basic assets would hold little appeal for a terrorist group that, like any organized entity, requires at least a semblance of structure to operate.

Related to the idea of adequate infrastructure is the idea of reasonably easy access to terrorists' desired attack venues. In the case of groups in the global jihadist movement, this means areas that are in proximity to U.S. or Western targets. Targets could take the form of diplomatic missions and military facilities; Western-owned banks and businesses; or tourist sites frequented by Westerners. Thus, an ungoverned territory, such as southern Somalia, which is contiguous to a target-rich environment such as urban centers in Kenya and Tanzania, would be more attractive to jihadist groups than one that is a long distance away or separated by difficult terrain from potential targets.

Unless they can tap into external sources of income, such as donations from “charitable” organizations or remittances from sympathizers or Diaspora communities, terrorists and insurgents need to generate revenue from local sources to finance their activities. Paul Collier’s World Bank studies have documented a linkage between regions that derive a substantial share of their income (GDP) from the export of primary commodities and the growth of rebel movements. These commodities provide easy targets of opportunity for terrorists and insurgents, who have the firepower to deal themselves into the trade. They can trade the commodities themselves, as in the case of the Revolutionary United Front (FUR) of Sierra Leone and “conflict diamonds,” or they can protect and “tax” them, which is the preferred approach of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the cocaine industry.

Ungoverned territories are not demographic blank slates. They are home to complex societies, some of which lend themselves to terrorist penetration while others do not. Successful penetration of an area by terrorists or insurgents requires a base of support, willing or coerced, in the local community. Local extremist groups or minorities within the population that have become alienated could serve this function. The prototype of the symbiosis of foreign terrorists and local communities is Pakistan’s FATA. Throughout the area there are Arabs who fought in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, along with Uzbeks and other Central Asians, all sharing sanctuaries and cooperating. Many have married local women and acquired status as members of local clans and extended families. Dislodging these foreign fighters thus poses serious social and cultural problems.

Regions where there are grievances against the regime or a preexisting state of communal conflict are attractive to outside Islamist extremist groups. This is the case in the North Caucasus, where Islamist militants have co-opted the Chechens’ struggle for independence from Russia. There is also significant overlap between the conflict in Kashmir and the global jihadist movement. In the Moluccas and the region of Poso, on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia, armed extremists from other parts of Indonesia introduced themselves into local conflicts and turned them into full-blown religious wars. These “local jihads” not only enable extremists to gain support among the broader Muslim population by presenting themselves as defenders of endangered Muslim communities, but also provide new members with a “rite of passage” that, as Southeast Asia terrorism expert Zachary Abuza has noted, is the functional equivalent of the founding generation’s experience in Afghanistan.

Social assistance programs, in which the motives of the providers—whether religious, ideological, or cultural—are congruent with those of terrorists or insurgents, can often be subverted or

exploited to support terrorist and insurgent objectives. Throughout areas of conflict in the Muslim world, Gulf-based Islamic charities have provided funding and support that, intentionally or not, has been diverted to armed militants. Increasingly, as other sources of funding have been interdicted by more stringent controls on financial flows, terrorists have to rely on income from criminal activity. The nexus of terrorism and crime opens the possibility of strategic alliances through which terrorists and criminal groups can share logistical corridors, safe havens, and money-laundering arrangements. Pragmatically exploiting these conduits, terrorists can entrench themselves in ungoverned territories and use them to plan operations, train and battle-test cadres, scout for new "talent," stockpile weaponry, and move personnel and materiel.

Finally, ungoverned territories make it easier for terrorists to become invisible to the national and local authorities (if there are any) and to the international community. Invisibility is not the same as operational security. Operational security is a set of procedures to avoid compromising an operation. Invisibility is a function of the environment in which terrorists operate. It may be a product of similarity in appearance, language, and conduct. Alternatively, invisibility may be a consequence of the anonymity provided by modern, cosmopolitan mass society, in which diversity in appearance, language, and behavior is the norm, rendering terrorist operatives no more remarkable than the usual run of human heterogeneity.

A key question concerns the relationship between invisibility and operational access—the terrorists' ability to access and strike their targets. Withdrawal to remote areas reduces the terrorists' visibility but also impedes their access to the infrastructure and resources that they need to operate. Consequently there is a trade-off between security and effectiveness. The tension between the terrorists' need to surface for operations and to remain hidden from the authorities could offer counterterrorism authorities opportunities to discover them and take action against them.

#### **Types of Ungoverned Territories**

Depending on the circumstances that gave rise to their present condition of absent or ineffective governance, ungoverned territories align with a three-part typology: contested, incomplete, and abdicated governance. In contested governance, a group refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the government's rule and pledges loyalty to some other form of organization, such as an insurgent movement, tribe or clan, or other identity group that actively contests the government's efforts to establish control. Chechnya, Mindanao, and Colombia are prominent examples. These insurgencies may be of different kinds: separatist, Islamist, or Marxist. Separatists usually adhere to some sort of ideology, but their primary goal is establishing their own state in their ethnic

homeland rather than imposing their rule on the rest of the country. In other cases, the goal of the rebels is to establish their rule in a swath of territory as a steppingstone to wresting control of the whole country, or to profit from illegal activities without the interference of state authorities.

In cases of incomplete governance, a state seeks to exert its authority over its territory and produce public goods for its populace, but lacks the resources to do so. Throughout many developing countries, governments are unable to maintain a competent, qualified presence that can enforce the laws and provide services to the population. Other forces, some tribal, some criminal, fill the vacuum that results.

In cases of abdicated governance, the central government, instead of operating to produce public goods such as safety and order, infrastructure and services, abdicates its responsibilities for poor provinces and regions where it concludes that maintaining a presence is not cost effective or where ethnic minorities with whom the government shares little affinity predominate. A more malign form of abdicated governance is the outcome of political decisions by those in power to operate outside the formal agencies of the states. For instance, Sierra Leone's prewar dictator, Siaka Stevens, was uninterested in building his state's bureaucracies and seemed to have taken active steps to tear them down. But he did rule, mostly through informal channels and militias. The situation was similar in Liberia under Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor.

#### **Policy implications**

These types of ungoverned territories are not mutually exclusive. Often, regions suffer from two or all three of them. There is value, however, in identifying the sources of ungoverned territories because they point to policy options for addressing the resulting problems. Understanding the causes of an ungoverned territory can also illuminate which policy options are likely to be ineffective or inappropriate. For example, state capacity building would be the appropriate response to cases of incomplete governance. Capacity building, on the other hand, assumes that the state's leadership wants to increase the effectiveness of state institutions.

In cases of abdicated governance, one possible option could be to use development assistance as a tool to encourage recipient governments to invest in infrastructure and institutions in regions where they have previously abdicated their governing responsibilities. If, on the other hand, the governing style and methods of the ruling group were at the root of the problem, strengthening the state would require instigating more profound social and political change. Such states might not be salvageable through the usual institutional reform mechanisms.

Competent governance requires a reduction in corruption. Deep, pervasive corruption is commonplace in countries with ungoverned territories (and not only there). It diverts public funds for private use, perverts due process to undermine the law, protects officials and their cronies from prosecution, and otherwise destroys the effective functioning of the institutions of government. There are few prospects for reform in countries where holding office is one of the few pathways to prosperity. In fact, the incentives run the other way—toward more ruthless, repressive behavior and human rights violations to preserve the ruling circles' privileges and position.

The RAND study shows that lack of coordination among agencies is a major obstacle to governments' ability to improve governance in ungoverned territories. Therefore, providing expert advice to officials on how to coordinate their actions across departments and minimize bureaucratic competition would be an important step in strengthening public sector capabilities.

Upgrading the transportation infrastructure could have profound effects in many ungoverned territories considered in this study because it would improve overall mobility within society. Improved mobility means that the police and judicial officials can expand their activities to remote areas; that legal crops can be brought to market at competitive prices, reducing the attractiveness of narcotics and other illicit crops; and that other utilities—electricity, and water—can reach remote regions of a country, as can health care, public education, and the rule of law.

Because the effects of ungoverned territories—transnational crime, arms trafficking, illegal migration—may cross borders to infect neighboring states, regional architectures might be an especially useful way to enlist neighbors for collective action. That said international cooperation, when it attempts action through formal international organizations, has at best a mixed record. Different states may not share a set of interests, which can confound cooperation and timely, effective collective action. As an alternative, the United States and its partners might promote less formal regional architectures to coordinate the efforts of those states that do share similar concerns about the effects of ungoverned territories on their security. Interested countries and other influential stakeholders need only agree to work constructively to create initiatives that would in some measure limit the corrosive effects of ungoverned territories.

The regional architecture approach might similarly enlist local cooperation to coordinate infrastructure development to project authority, order, economic activity, justice, and other public goods into ungoverned areas. At the same time, the United States and its partners must exercise caution to ensure that its assistance efforts are not wasted by entrenched corruption in the public administration of recipient countries.

Some of the policy prescriptions aimed at addressing problems of governance will also reduce a region's conduciveness to terrorist activities, for example, building the capacity of the local military and counterterrorism forces. Other steps that the United States could take to address problems of an ungoverned territory's conduciveness to a terrorist presence could include the following:

*Reduce terrorist exploitation of infrastructure.* Terrorists typically need two types of infrastructure for their activities; they need transportation, and they need the means to move funds. The United States and its partners might, therefore, make training and assistance available to the local government so that it could deploy officers in sufficient numbers to detect and apprehend terrorists trying to move about. Terrorists also need to move money and pay for purchases, so modern monetary and banking systems with safeguards against money laundering and software for tracking financial transactions could prove to be an impediment to terrorist transactions.

*Deny terrorists sources of income.* Terrorists derive income from criminal activity or from the black market or grey economies of the regions they inhabit. The United States therefore might help a government's efforts to suppress or reduce the criminal activities that fund terrorists. Counter-drug assistance in regions where terrorist groups are involved in the illicit drug trade can also have a counterterrorism effect.

*Prevent exploitation of social service programs.* The more states fail to produce public goods—public health services, education, social welfare services—and the population becomes dependent for those services upon charities with links to militant organizations, the greater the probability that some of the assistance programs will be funneled by sympathizers to terrorists or extremists. Therefore, programs that help governments build capacity in these sectors would eventually reduce the scope of terrorist exploitation of social services.

*Make invisibility more difficult to achieve.* Assistance that improves a state's ability to exert control over its borders, for instance: instrumentation to detect illegal entrants, coastal surveillance systems, counterfeit-resistant passports, border crossing watch lists, and biometric identification technologies reduce the probability that terrorists can cross borders undetected. Assistance in the form of intelligence sharing and warnings could also be important in reducing a terrorist's anonymity.

It goes without saying that the problem of ungoverned territories reflects deep-seated longstanding problems in the societies where they occur and the recommendations made above

are unlikely to make a region completely inhospitable to terrorism. However, taken collectively, these recommendations would make the region less appealing and more dangerous for terrorists.

Building government capacity and expanding the central government's writ into ungoverned territories is the work of generations. Many of these policies are difficult to implement. Nevertheless, if the United States works with its partners to implement them, then—despite individual failings and inefficiencies—the overall results would help to make ungoverned areas less hospitable to terrorists and much less conducive to their activities. Taken in tandem with policies to reduce the number and size of ungoverned territories, the results could mean enhanced constraints on terrorism, international organized crime, and other plagues that traditionally have been spawned and nurtured in ungoverned territories.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Doctor.  
Dr. Etzioni.

**STATEMENT OF AMITAI ETZIONI**

Mr. ETZIONI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

I particularly bemoan the loss of Congressman Lantos, having a somewhat similar personal history. I started as a Jewish child in Nazi Germany. From there, I learned to become a member of the Jewish community in Palestine and engaged in terrorist acts to encourage the British to leave before they wanted to leave. So I gained some experience in the subject at hand. And finally, I joined what today would be called the Israeli Special Forces, though in my days they were called commandoes and I spent 2½ years.

So I feel, I not only studied the matter for 40 years, but I had some experience in it. And my main topic for discussion is what I see as a major mismatch between the needed priorities and the distribution of resources. The point I want to make most, I did not set it up that way, but it so happened that nobody mentioned so far a connection between terrorists and nuclear weapons, which I think partly everybody looked at the subject, considered by far a greater threat.

It does not mean that we don't have to worry about garden-variety terrorists and regular attacks. But the best way I can quickly make my point is that you can be all in favor of putting seatbelts into cars and airbags and child seats, but realize there are going to be accidents. But you do not want to have a 100,000 car pile-up.

So I think our first, second and third priority should be to avoid the connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. That is not the way we are set up. If you think about it, as if we are dealing with three fronts, one is hardening the targets, so if we are attacked, the attacks will fail or will cause less damage. But the focus is, we have so many targets, so we are trying to protect nuclear plants, we are trying to protect dams, we try to protect bridges and water reservoirs. We have coastlines, there is almost an endless list of targets. And each one of them, for good reason, argues that we need to harden this target.

But in the end, to put it bluntly, it is a bottomless pit. You read every week in the newspaper, the last one was about reactors, today some site, bridges not well protected. You could spend the GDP times three and still, in a free society, be subject to some low scale attacks.

Let me just add one to the list and move to the second front. I must say I am not often speechless. I have many weaknesses, but that is not one of them. But I met the former commander of the Coast Guard, and he explained to me that there are about 2 million recreational vessels who leave the coast and go 7 days, whatever, deep sea fishing or touring. And they come back and they pass through no control whatsoever.

So if we examine every suitcase and every nail clipper of somebody who comes into an airport, but those of you who did those boats, you go behind some other island and you meet these other boats from other countries and you exchange beers and fish stories

and God knows what else. And you come back and nobody checks your passport or what's on your boat. This is just one more of the many examples one could give, that have been given, that make it so difficult to win this war by hardening the target.

The second front, which I strongly cherish, is we are trying to get the terrorists before they get to us. We very much agree, there has been considerable success on this front. Unfortunately, and we must do that, the nature of the beast is for every one we kill, there are two others lining up. And so that is also not a way we are going to get a handle on the problem.

We come then to a conclusion which the chairman referred earlier to be a positive, can-do society, with a kind of innate optimism, useful in that sense, which is very commendable and very difficult for to accept tragic conclusions. The tragic conclusion is that probably in the longer run we will not be able to avoid the kinds of attacks we have seen in Madrid and London. And at best, we can focus on taking out a city, turning it into a radioactive desert.

Now, if you for a moment accept that the threat front, avoiding massive attacks, is the most important one, then you very quickly come to a list which fortunately is a do-able list of things which we can complete. So for instance, a Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which tries to convert reactors which have highly enriched uranium, which is the easiest to use to make nuclear bombs, into low enriched uranium or other means of energy; there is a limited list of places which have that. And we in effect may have already an inroad into them. And if we would put our resources and priorities to that program, we could in a reasonable time lick that part of the problem.

The challenge in Russia is larger for reasons I don't have time to go into. But accelerating that part of the so-called [foreign phrase] would also serve. I realize there are many difficulties.

The PSI is playing a major role which I think deserves much more attention and much more credit. In fact, as a model, the whole new kind of global architecture which combines a more muscular foreign policy with one which frankly, I don't lose sleep nights exactly over what the United Nations says. I will admit that, growing up in the Middle East, you don't think the United Nations is completely sacred. But Resolution 1540 provides a blessing to the kind of things PSI does. So by the international game, it is not only muscular, but it is also legitimate.

So I think we need to look more, its main purpose is to stop the trade and transport in nuclear—

Mr. TIERNEY. For the record, would you just describe PSI, using its full name so we have that on the record?

Mr. ETZIONI. It is a Proliferation Security Initiative. It is an activity, not an organization, initiated by the United States, in which 60 nations voluntarily cooperate with the United States to prevent the transport of nuclear weapons and nuclear material. The kind of thing which brought the change in Libya, because they caught a ship on its way to Libya full of nuclear stuff and missiles and such. And that, in turn, was proof that he was engaging in a program of weapons of mass destruction. It was one of the factors. The other was the event in New York.

And that was really one other point I would like to make. I think what we are calling for in the project is not inspection. The notion that you have to leave countries what should be called dual-use facilities, which can be used both for civilian purposes and to make nuclear weapons, and you are just going to inspect to ensure that they will not use them for military purposes, which is all we are asking from Iran at the moment, is a major mistake. Because the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows you to send a letter, North Korea did, and say, sorry, we are leaving, and 3 months later you take with you your toys, your fully developed nuclear plan and you make nuclear weapons very much in line with the treaty.

So what we need is a delivery model. We pack the whole thing away and stop supporting terrorism. And that is the model we should have in mind. I think it is apparently in North Korea, it has not been yet applied to Iran.

I don't want to go on, but the main point of this is, our system, which is profoundly democratic and pluralistic, by nature, responds to various constituencies, as it should. Each one of them feels that they have a mission which must be attended to. As a result, our national programs tend to have a patchwork quality. One of the great things you could do in your committee is step back from that a moment and look at the overarching distribution of resources and say, is it matched to the distribution of the threat. We cannot do everything, granted, and therefore, setting priorities is essential.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Etzioni follows:]

Amitai Etzioni

Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform;  
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:

Thursday, February 14, 2008

10 am

2247 Rayburn House Office Building

I am grateful for the opportunity to testify on this important subject. As someone who served as a commander in the Israeli army, and lived in the Middle East for 21 years, I have some first-hand knowledge of our subject, in addition to having studied it for forty years beginning with a book *Winning Without War* published in 1964.

Dealing with homeland security we are advancing on 3 fronts: (a) Hardening the targets; (b) neutralizing the terrorists before they can get us; and (c) preventing the worst attacks—nuclear ones. We are spending too much on the first front, which is a bottomless pit; we cannot succeed on the second front because fighting terrorists overseas generates more terrorists. We do the least where we should do most: preventing the truly catastrophic attacks, massive terrorism, turning one of our cities into a radioactive desert.

On the first front, we face an almost endless list of security challenges: our borders are far from sealed; the Coast Guard badly needs new equipment; the Real ID program is behind schedule; nuclear reactors, water resources, dams

and bridges are not adequately protected; hospitals have not been prepared to handle the kind of patient surge that would occur after a biological attack; and on and on. Given that we have 300 million visits a year by foreigners, if we going to rely on hardening the targets, including preventing terrorists from entering the US, we are sure to fail. I am not saying we should not invest on this front, but that we must realize the severe limits of what can be achieved.

On the second front, the measures that must be undertaken to hunt down terrorists in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Gaza tend to feed the alienation of young locals (which, of course, has many other sources). As a result, for every terrorist we kill, at least several others are lining up. We may suppress them in this or that area only for them to pop up in some other places.

Again we cannot sit back and let them prepare their attack in equanimity, and we can and must disturb their operations and delay attacks. But we must also realize that this approach will not spare us from future attacks.

Hence, one comes to the difficult conclusion that we must focus on avoiding the worst attacks. This is akin to holding that if you cannot avoid traffic accidents, despite all welcome efforts to introduce seatbelts, airbags, child seats and other such measures, you would want to at least avoid a fifty car pile-up. Only that, in this case, if even a small nuclear device is exploded, we are talking about the equivalent of a hundred thousands care pile up, that is 100,000 casualties or many more.

On the domestic front, granting top priority to preventing massive attacks entails several changes in policy: subjecting to border controls the millions of recreational vessels that leave and come to US coasts but are now not subject to normal border controls; ensuring that the people who work in ports pass security clearances; providing better counter-measures against speedboats and

identifying all small aircraft that enter US space with an order to shoot down those that do not identify themselves.

On the international level, I strongly disagree with the four senior statesmen who have recently called for total and complete nuclear disarmament. The pursuit of such a dream will delay that what must and can urgently be done. The focus should be on the states from which terrorists may acquire nuclear weapons and the material from which they can be made—namely, failing and rogue states. Thus, we currently need to worry much more about Pakistan and even Russia than, say, about the nuclear weapons of France or the Plutonium accumulated by Japan

The best way to prevent the theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and the materials from which they can be made-- is to remove them from failing and rogue states. Hence, we should adopt an overarching concept of deproliferation (or 'rollback'), in which nuclear arms are removed for failing and rouge states rather than providing better security over such weapons, by better guarding them and by inspecting dual use assets to ensure that they used only for civilian purposes. Similarly, we need less reliance on safeguarding dangerous materials and more on blending them down, or removing them to safe-havens.

Accordingly, we need to immediately supplement and gradually replace the regime of inspections—which seeks to ensure that assets that can be used for both civilian and military purposes will be used only for civilian ones—with one that seeks the removal of all such assets and their replacement with assets such as LEU and light water reactors, which cannot be directly used to make nuclear arms.

There are important precedents for such a deproliferation approach in the removal of nuclear arms from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in past

successes dealing with Libya, in the (yet to be tested) current progress dealing with North Korea, and in several elements of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

We should enhance these threat reduction programs by according them much higher political priority and greater budgetary and administrative allocations. Nations leading such deproliferation efforts should be encouraged to proceed with all deliberate speed by offering nations of greatest concern various positive incentives, such as other sources of energy or support to convert or shut down facilities using HEU. Sanctions should be employed only if such positive inducements fail.

If a nation is willing to put on the table its nuclear weapons program in exchange for a non-aggression treaty and other assurance that its government will not be overthrown by the use of force, as has been repeatedly reported that both Iran and North Korea suggested, this is a deal well worth exploring.

Furthermore, the deproliferation approach calls for dismantling, replacing, and banning the trade in and use of the means from which nuclear arms can be made, especially highly enriched uranium (HEU). Here the PSI can play a major role.

Priorities must be set even within this third front. Overreaching and overpromising produces their own dangers. Hence, one should note that although plutonium and spent fuel must also be deproliferated, we observe that these materials seem less attractive means for would-be nuclear terrorists to employ as they are much more difficult to handle than ready-made bombs and HEU. Hence, removing HEU, banning the construction of reactors that use it, and otherwise suppressing it, should proceed as quickly as possible even if the same arrangements cannot be made in the near future for plutonium and spent fuels.

While international supply and ownership of HEU is preferable to national control, it is not fully compatible with the deproliferation approach as it relies on inspections to ensure that HEU will be used for only civilian purpose by those to which it is allotted, and as it assumes that the buy-back of plutonium and spent fuel can be reliably implemented.

The norm that condemns nations who set out to develop nuclear arms should be reinforced and not undermined. This is especially needed now as a new nuclear 'itch' is in evidence. Japan, several nations in the Middle East and several in Latin America (such as Brazil), are all reconsidering their nuclear postures. I strongly reject the notion that "good" governments can be trusted with nuclear arms. Any proliferation anywhere is a threat. All nations that are considering nuclear arms production should be persuaded and otherwise discouraged from pursuing such nuclear ambitions

We should be particularly concerned with the lack of enforcement available under the NPT: the cumbersome process by which findings must be approved by the IAEA board and then submitted to action the UN Security Council. Hence, even if calls for action survive a veto by one power or another, their implementation is still contingent on action by national powers. Hence the importance of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which provides a particularly valuable (and little known) model for a new global architecture that is both robust and considered legitimate (even blessed by UN resolution 1540).

In conclusion I note that our pluralistic, democratic system—the best there is, but not without flaws—has a hard time setting priorities. Each constituency legitimately pulls the nation in the direction it holds dear. As a result, our security system often looks like a patch-work rather than a carefully laid-out, over-arching plan. Theoretically the Office of Management and Budget and certain Congressional committees should work out such an

overview, but—to put it carefully—this is not always the way it works. Maybe Homeland Security needs something similar to the Base CIsong Comisson, a bi-partisan commission to set priorities which then will be voted up or down but not re-arranged. I realize that this is very unlikely to take place, but my job is to call them the way I see them. The nation would be best served if we realize that we have many more security needs than we can possible serve and hence setting priorities, indeed triage, is vital.

Amitai Etzioni is professor of International Relations at The George Washington University. He is the author of, most recently, *Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy* (Yale, 2007) ([www.securityfirstbook.com](http://www.securityfirstbook.com)). He has served as a Senior Advisor to the White House and as President of the American Sociological Association, and has also taught at Columbia University, Harvard University, and University of California-Berkeley. He was listed as one of the top 100 American intellectuals in Richard Posner's book *Public Intellectuals*. He served as an Israeli commando in the Israeli war for independence.

February 6, 2008

## Intelligence Chief Says Al Qaeda Improves Ability to Strike in U.S.

By MARK MAZZETTI

Al Qaeda is gaining in strength from its refuge in Pakistan and is steadily improving its ability to recruit, train and position operatives capable of carrying out attacks inside the United States, the director of national intelligence told a Senate panel on Tuesday.

The director, Mike McConnell, told lawmakers that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, remained in control of the terrorist group and had promoted a new generation of lieutenants. He said Al Qaeda was also improving what he called "the last key aspect of its ability to attack the U.S." — producing militants, including new Western recruits, capable of blending into American society and attacking domestic targets.

A senior intelligence official said Tuesday evening that the testimony was based in part on new evidence that Qaeda operatives in Pakistan were training Westerners, most likely including American citizens, to carry out attacks. The official said there was no indication as yet that Al Qaeda had succeeded in getting operatives into the United States.

The testimony, in an annual assessment of the threats facing the United States, was the latest indication that Al Qaeda appears to have significantly rebuilt a network battered by the American invasion of Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 attacks.

It follows a National Intelligence Estimate last summer that described a resurgent Al Qaeda, and could add fuel to criticisms from Democratic lawmakers and presidential candidates that the White House focus on Iraq since 2002 has diverted attention and resources from the battle against the Qaeda organization's core.

In recent weeks, fresh concerns about the threat posed by Al Qaeda have prompted senior Bush administration officials to travel to Pakistan to seek approval for more aggressive American military action against militants based in the tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.

As part of his testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also offered the government's most extensive public defense for the use of waterboarding, saying that the C.I.A. had used the harsh interrogation technique against three Qaeda operatives in 2002 and 2003 in a belief that another terrorist attack on the United States was imminent. He identified the three as Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

General Hayden said the technique, which induces a feeling of drowning, had not been used since 2003. Mr. McConnell said that a future C.I.A. request to use waterboarding on a detainee would need to be approved both by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey and by President Bush.

The C.I.A. is the only agency permitted under law to use interrogation methods more aggressive than those used by the American military. Senate Democrats sought to use the hearing to exploit divisions about those techniques.

Both Robert S. Mueller III, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers that their agencies had successfully obtained valuable intelligence from terrorism suspects without using what Mr. Mueller called the "coercive" methods of the C.I.A.

But General Hayden bristled when asked about Congressional attempts to mandate that C.I.A. interrogators be required to use the more limited set of interrogation methods contained in the Army Field Manual, which is used by military interrogators.

"It would make no more sense to apply the Army's field manual to C.I.A.," General Hayden said, "than it would to take the Army Field Manual on grooming and apply it to my agency, or the Army Field Manual on recruiting and apply it to my agency. Or, for that matter, the Army Field Manual on sexual orientation and apply it to my agency."

During the testimony, Mr. McConnell tried to recalibrate somewhat the intelligence agencies' view of Iran's nuclear program, telling senators that the public portion of a National Intelligence Estimate released in December placed too much significance on the fact that Iran had halted secret work on nuclear weapons design in 2003.

Mr. McConnell said that weapons design was "probably the least significant part of the program" and that Iran's refusal to halt uranium enrichment meant that it still posed a potential nuclear threat.

The fact that Iran was continuing its enrichment efforts was mentioned in that intelligence assessment, but Republican lawmakers and many conservative commentators have criticized the report as misleading.

Intelligence officials have defended the assessment on Iran as an example of the more rigorous analysis that American spy agencies have adopted in response to the prewar intelligence failures on Iraq. But while Mr. McConnell praised the assessment, he said his office had not been clear enough about its conclusions as it hurried to make it public.

"In retrospect, as I mentioned, I would do some things differently," he said.

Among his litany of worldwide threats, Mr. McConnell also warned the Senate panel about the growing threat of "cyberattacks" by terror groups or homegrown militants. He said President Bush signed a classified directive in January outlining steps to protect American computer networks.

In his testimony on Al Qaeda, Mr. McConnell said Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri were precluded by "security concerns" from the day-to-day running of the organization. But he said both men "regularly pass inspirational messages and specific operational guidance to their followers through public statements."

Mr. McConnell said the flow of foreign militants into Iraq slowed somewhat during the final months of 2007. At the same time, however, he warned that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the largely homegrown Sunni insurgent group in Iraq that American officials say is led by foreigners, could shift its focus to carrying out attacks outside Iraq.

Based on captured documents, Mr. McConnell said, fewer than 100 militants from Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia to date have left Iraq to establish cells in other countries.

Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, blamed the Iraq war for undermining the campaign against Al Qaeda.

"The focus of America's military forces and intelligence resources were mistakenly shifted," he said, "from delivering a decisive blow against Al Qaeda, which is the enemy."

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I would just say that this is exactly a point that Mr. Shays, the ranking member, and I, and other members on this committee have been talking about. What we haven't done, Doctor, is what you recommend about pulling back and maybe having a hearing or series of hearings about whether or not those are matching up. I think that is excellent advice. Thank you.  
Dr. Byman.

#### STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN

Mr. BYMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Marchant, and other members of the subcommittee.

My written testimony focuses on five aspects of U.S. counter-terrorism: the use of force, intelligence, homeland security, information campaigns and diplomacy. In my spoken remarks, I am going to only focus on a few of these aspects in an effort to keep my remarks brief.

Let me first talk about one aspect of the use of force that in my judgment doesn't get enough attention, which is efforts to defeat insurgencies linked to Al Qaeda. This comes up from time to time when there are discussions about Afghanistan and Iraq, of course. But it is also a problem in Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria, Pakistan and other places. It is not a secret that the most important military units for this are special operations forces. But what is neglected is a tremendously important form of the use of force, because it is not associated directly with military forces, which is police.

One of the biggest challenges is dealing with areas such as Dr. Rabasa talked about: ungoverned spaces. In these areas, what you want to do is develop the rule of law, develop police and security forces, so a small group of terrorists is not able to form a large insurgency over time. That is an exceptionally difficult challenge.

And far more important at the early stage than the military is the police. In fact, it is reasonable to say that if you have to call out the military in large numbers, you have failed already at the early stages. Unfortunately in our Government, no bureaucracy wants to embrace the mission of training the police. There are scattered programs in the State Department, the Department of Justice, the CIA, and the Department of Defense. But it is not at the core of any of these missions. As a result, the resources are not there and the high-level attention is not there.

A second area that I believe needs attention is in homeland security. Right now, many of our analyses focus on worst case scenarios and don't consider the very real limits of our adversaries. Much of our spending is done without a formal risk analysis and it looks only at the consequences of a successful attack, rather than the likelihood of such an attack. The result is we waste a tremendous amount of money and also there are large opportunity costs.

Right now, the FBI is focusing far less on gangs, on domestic terrorist groups like white supremacists and on the drug trade, even though these are extremely serious problems. Instead, we should do several things. One of the most obvious is that we should really try to think like the terrorists. And here, let me commend the work that the people at the Harmony project are doing. When we think about our own defenses, we need to think about targets that might resonate with the audiences that jihadists care about.

There has been a tremendous amount of attention in Congress on port security. I have yet to see a credible plan by Al Qaeda to focus on blowing up or doing damage to a port. As a result, we put a lot of money into something that I believe could be better spent elsewhere.

Also let me emphasize a point Dr. Etzioni made, which is that we can't and shouldn't defend everything. If we try to defend everything, in the end we are going to defend nothing, because all our defenses will be over-stretched.

Another important part of homeland security, though, is perception management. Right now, there is a widespread public perception that the odds of dying from terrorism in the United States are quite high, when in fact, in reality, as we all know here, they are exceptionally low. Unfortunately, our public debate has made this worse, not better. A particular problem is distinguishing between true weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons and infectious biological weapons, and what is often lumped into this category, radiological weapons, chemical weapons and non-infectious biological weapons. These weapons are typically far less dangerous than explosives.

At the same time, however, their psychological impact is much greater. The anthrax attacks in 2001 had a devastating effect on our country's commerce and public morale, even though the number of people killed, while their deaths were tragic, was relatively low. A constant Government message that reinforces the limited damage that these weapons cause would be exceptionally useful.

A third part of homeland security is that the United States enjoys an overwhelming advantage over many of its allies around the world, which is a well-integrated, highly supportive, highly loyal American Muslim community. Any measures we take on counter-terrorism at home have to factor in that alienating this community would be disastrous. Many of the tips we have received on current terrorism that have proven valid have come from this community. If we lose the support of this community, we are in a far worse situation.

I will conclude with some brief remarks about information operations. As we saw from the video, Al Qaeda has an extremely effective information campaign. One of my favorite little asides was in a recent bin Laden video. There was an al Sahab coffee mug, they have gone to the point of branding their various information technologies.

We are nowhere near as sophisticated. And when we do counter-terrorism, in general our policy seems to be, we decide our policy and then pass it on to the people who do public diplomacy to clean up any messes that result, when in fact public diplomacy and information operations should often be at the heart of counter-terrorism, because it is psychological.

Particularly important is going negative against the jihadists. They are exceptionally unpopular when you look at their agenda, whether it is their anti-democracy view, their view that many Muslims, including many practicing Muslims, are in fact apostates because they are not jihadists. Their deliberate targeting of women and children, these are unpopular views.

But when the debate is about U.S. policy in the Middle East, whether it is Iraq or Israel, we are going to lose that debate. When the debate is about their activities, there we are going to win. Unfortunately, our information operations try to defend our policies much more than they put the jihadists on the defensive.

I will conclude by noting that I welcome a hearing like this simply because I think there has not been a broad public debate on many of the more controversial or difficult aspects of counter-terrorism. To succeed in the next 25 years, we are going to need sustained policies that don't change administration by administration. And to do that, we are going to need widespread congressional support, as well as much broader public support.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]

Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House  
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
“Six Years Later: Innovative Approaches to Defeating Al Qaeda”

February 14, 2008

Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel Byman

Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies of the Edmund A. Walsh School of  
Foreign Service at Georgetown University  
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Shays, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, and Subcommittee staff, I am grateful for this opportunity to speak before you today.

It is a truism widely repeated that the United States must think differently to confront the challenge of terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Yet, despite spending billions of dollars and the passage of over six years, much remains to be done before the United States is ready to meet its new adversary.

My testimony focuses on ways to improve the following aspects of U.S. counterterrorism: 1. use of force; 2. collection and employment of intelligence; 3. homeland security strategy; 4. information campaigns; and 5. diplomatic alliances. I conclude with a call for a more informed public debate—such as this hearing—to review the most controversial counterterrorism measures and develop a broad consensus on the appropriate measures.<sup>1</sup>

**I. The Use of Force**

U.S. uses of force can be divided into four types: limited retaliatory strikes; targeted killings of terrorist leaders; counterinsurgency; and regime change capabilities as a deterrent. Limited strikes usually fail or backfire, but the other three types of force are necessary for a robust counterterrorism capability.

Limited uses of force against state sponsors or terrorist groups themselves are mostly counterproductive. Most governments and terrorist groups view capitulation in the aftermath of a military attack as an unconscionable admission of weakness, particularly when the strike affects only a few people. For the Taliban to have surrendered bin Laden after the 1998 U.S. strikes on Afghanistan, for example, would have demonstrated to a highly nationalistic people that the regime caved in the face of outside pressure.

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<sup>1</sup> This testimony draws heavily on my recently released book, *The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad* (Wiley, 2008).

Difficulties multiply when force is used directly against terrorists. Terrorist groups themselves have few assets worth destroying. Training camps are rudimentary, and the weapons systems involved are small and easy to replace. There is a strong likelihood of significant civilian casualties, especially if air strikes are employed. Some terrorists deliberately put their facilities near hospitals and schools, targets that are off-limit for civilized nations. Even worse, the terrorists often retaliate. The 1986 air strike on Libya led Muammar el-Qaddafi's regime to conduct the Pan Am 103 bombing as well as a spate of smaller attacks. Perhaps most important, military strikes can make a terrorist group stronger. The 1998 U.S. strikes against al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan made Osama Bin Ladin a hero.

The targeted killing of terrorist leaders is at times necessary for the United States. Targeted killings, however, must be used carefully. They are a poor second to arrests, which are often an option for America; the United States has arrested many more top-tier al-Qa'ida leaders than it has killed. Moreover, the intelligence and military requirements of a sustained targeted killing, or even mass arrest campaign are often daunting, as the United States must operate globally. Even more important, the United States fights salafi jihadists in large part by working with squeamish European countries and wobbly Muslim ones, both of which disapprove of extrajudicial killing for ethical or political reasons, particularly if the attack is highly visible.

A third category for using force receives relatively little attention outside the immediate contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan but is a crucial task for U.S. military forces: fighting al-Qa'ida-linked insurgencies. Al-Qa'ida has many ties to local Islamist insurgencies, and countering the salafi jihadist cause in general at times require fighting them. Insurgencies enhance al-Qa'ida, extending its operations far beyond its own narrow location. Because al-Qa'ida can tap into these insurgencies for recruits, it can replenish its members as they are killed.<sup>2</sup> Insurgencies add legitimacy to al-Qa'ida. Muslims around the world endorse these local struggles—independence for Chechnya, opposition to Serb oppression in the Balkans, and so on—even though they might otherwise oppose al-Qa'ida's ideological agenda and use of terrorism.

Although the United States has a central role to play in these battles in rare cases such as Afghanistan (and, should things worsen dramatically, tribal parts of Pakistan), whenever possible counterinsurgency is best done by local forces. The United States can play a critical role in integrating intelligence, improving communications, and most important, honing the tactical skills of local forces. Still, the United States cannot expect to enter these countries as local saviors. Even with the best of intentions, foreigners can generate a nationalistic backlash among local citizens who otherwise feel little sympathy for the insurgents.<sup>3</sup> Significant numbers of U.S. troops destroy the legitimacy of local governments and allow the insurgents to claim that they are fighting for the people against outsiders: a damning criticism.

<sup>2</sup> The ability to recruit and replace lost cadre is vital for successful terrorist organizations. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 34-36.

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion on the nationalistic backlash outside occupiers face, see David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, Vol. 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 49-91 and Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 137.

The most important military units for this task will be special operations forces (SOF), which currently number around 50,000. SOF will train foreign troops to fight insurgents, liaise with local populations, help gather intelligence, and otherwise serve as the foundation for the military's broader efforts against terrorism and insurgency. But counterinsurgency training involves more than just the allied army: it should include police, intelligence services, and paramilitary forces. This concept of "Foreign Internal Defense" can be resurrected and used once more against insurgencies. Building a strong police force is particularly important – usually much more important than aiding a military. Police typically are far better suited to defeating small groups, as they often know the communities well and are trained to use force discriminately.

Unlike the Italian *Carabinieri* or the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, the United States lacks a national police that has a paramilitary component, making it difficult to identify an obvious bureaucratic candidate for such an important training mission. The State Department is too small for a massive training mission, and programs in the Department of Justice are limited. Thus the mission falls upon the Department of Defense, which historically has resisted the foreign internal defense mission.<sup>4</sup> One bureaucracy should be tasked to take the lead on this mission, and Congressional pressure should be focused on ensuring it remains a priority.

Finally, the United States must preserve the capacity to topple regimes that provide substantial support for foreign terrorists. Part of the reason that there are no current governments providing support for terrorists like the Taliban's Afghanistan did is because governments fear a massive U.S. military response if they provide unconditional support for terrorism. Maintaining this fear is necessary to limit state support for terrorism.

## II. Improving Intelligence

Countries dedicated to preventing terrorist attacks around the globe must view the preservation and enhancement of intelligence as a top priority. Although U.S. intelligence is regularly criticized for its "failures," I believe that a key component of intelligence success—liaison with foreign services—has gone well since 9/11, and that the global intelligence effort against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates is strong. The bigger problem is limited domestic intelligence capabilities.

Although the United States should strive to improve its unilateral intelligence capabilities, for counterterrorism purposes these must at times take a back seat to liaison concerns. *Foreign liaison is the single greatest element of successful counterterrorism.* Only local governments have the numbers, legal authorities, and means of influence to comprehensively gather intelligence on the global salafi jihadist movement. If America attempts an independent operation abroad, be it a controversial attempt to recruit a foreign government official in Indonesia or a targeted killing operation in Pakistan, it must weigh any possible gains against the potential loss of government intelligence cooperation.

Nor can intelligence gathering be divorced from the issue of winning popular support, requiring attention to the information campaigns as discussed below. If allied governments are not popular (or not sufficiently feared), they will not be able to gather

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<sup>4</sup> See William Rosenau, "The Kennedy Administration, US Foreign Internal Security Assistance and the Challenge of 'Subterranean War'," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 14, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).

the necessary intelligence from their populace. Local residents may see terrorists as heroes—more Robin Hood than criminals to be arrested. In Pakistan’s tribal areas, bin Ladin remains far more popular than the United States, with local leaders clearly reluctant to provide information on his whereabouts.

U.S. intelligence capabilities are far weaker with regard to terrorism at home than they are concerning terrorism abroad. After over six years, the FBI still is far from being fully effective on counterterrorism. Ensuring a functioning domestic intelligence system must be a national priority. If we fail to gather accurate intelligence, we will not allocate resources properly, and the result will be both a tremendous waste of resources and glaring gaps in intelligence. Most important, we will miss opportunities to disrupt plots before they reach fruition.

At the very least, the United States should explore options for separating the FBI’s intelligence function from its other operations, either by creating a separate agency that focuses exclusively on domestic intelligence or by placing the domestic intelligence function within the Department of Homeland Security. Creating a separate agency makes the most sense on paper, but American suspicions of the very idea of “domestic intelligence,” even if the new agency’s powers were the same as those already given to the FBI, might make this a political non-starter. But DHS already has a mandate to reach out to the private sector and other areas outside the government. Moreover, because DHS is not a law enforcement agency, it does not threaten American citizens and appears less menacing to key communities in the United States.

### **III. Bolstering Homeland Security**

The current terrorist threat to the United States is real but not existential. However, too many analyses emphasize the worst possible case, and too few consider the very real limits of our adversaries and their objectives. It is tempting to say that too much preparation never hurts and that a steady drumbeat of fear is necessary to prepare for what is, in the end, a dangerous movement. But excess preparation is costly. At the very least, it can waste tens or hundreds of billions of dollars that could be better spent on fighting terrorists abroad, or for that matter, on domestic programs or a tax cut. Many terrorist preparation measures carry a considerable human and civil liberties cost. Strict immigration barriers prevent foreigners from studying and visiting our country, which in turn increases hostility to the U.S. government, perhaps even enhancing the potential for anti-U.S. terrorism.

Much state and local spending is done without a formal risk analysis that looks not only at the consequences of a successful attack, but also at the likelihood of the attack occurring in the first place.<sup>5</sup> Enterprising bureaucrats and legislators also use the counterterrorism label to justify their pet programs, ranging from anti-poverty (so terrorists don’t take advantage of despair and anger) to gun control and even to prescription drug benefits (citing the “terror” you would feel if you did not have access to your medication). The opportunity costs of these new foci are considerable. After 9/11, the FBI decreased spending on drug trafficking by 60 percent. Today the FBI and federal authorities focus less on gangs and on domestic terrorist groups (such as white

<sup>5</sup> Veronique de Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?,” American Enterprise Institute, April 1, 2005, 1.

supremacists), even though drugs and gangs have not become any less serious a problem.<sup>6</sup>

The United States should try to think like the terrorists and allocate its defenses accordingly: what targets would resonate with the overseas audiences the salafi jihadists seek to impress. National leadership is an obvious target (and one that is already well defended). Military bases are also targets as attacks on U.S. military forces are a feather in al-Qa'ida's cap because they avoid the opprobrium that comes with attacks on civilians. Other targets, such as nuclear and chemical plants and dams, warrant a prominent place on the defense list because of the possibility of mass casualties. Even if they are lower on the salafi jihadists' target list, they deserve extra scrutiny. Defenses should be concentrated on cities that have an international profile--Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles.

An important question to ask is "what are we not defending?" If the answer is that we want to defend all plausible targets, we will fail. Our effort will be overstretched, poorly coordinated, and inordinately expensive. In most low-priority cases, the standard defenses already in place for crime and accidents would suffice. If we overextend our defense networks to include all low-tech targets, we will reach the point where defenses will simply break down—a problem that many proponents of endless spending on homeland defense seem to miss.

Whether we try to defend all targets or not, some attacks will occur. If the passengers aboard American Airlines Flight 63 had been a little less alert (or Richard Reid, the "shoebomber," had been a little less stupid), there would have been many dead Americans. At some point, the attackers will be either exceptionally skilled, as they were on 9/11, or simply lucky, and Americans will die. Defenses can reduce the overall risk of terrorism, but they cannot eliminate it.

#### **Perception Management and Societal Resilience**

An important but often ignored part of homeland security is perception management. As scholar John Mueller contends: "The costs of terrorism commonly come much more from hasty, ill-considered, and over wrought reactions (or overreactions) to it than from anything terrorists have done."<sup>7</sup> After 9/11, Americans flew less and took fewer vacations, which led to massive job losses in the aviation and tourism industries. As Mueller further notes, the anthrax attacks that killed five people in 2001 have cost the U.S. Postal Service \$5 billion: a billion dollars per death.

In the United States the biggest risks are psychological, political, and economic. But because of the high level of fear that already exists, politicians sometimes overreact to terrorism, and, even fan the flames of fear. Instead, government agencies like the Department of Homeland Security should counter these fears by reinforcing the true odds of dying from a terrorist attack. To avoid frightening people, public alerts should be used sparingly. Since 9/11, alerts have been issued in response to intelligence chatter such as threats suggesting attacks on transatlantic flights or during major sporting and political

<sup>6</sup> Nicole J. Henderson, Christopher W. Ortiz, Naomi F. Sugie, and Joel Miller, *Law Enforcement & Arab American Community Relations After September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty* (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2006), 17 and 18. Available at <http://www.vera.org/policerelations>.

<sup>7</sup> John Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* no. 17 (2005), p. 491.

events. Each alert creates panic, and yet at the same each desensitizes the public to the real threat.

A particularly important perception that should be countered is the threat from chemical, radiological, and non-infectious biological weapons such as anthrax. Typically these weapons kill far fewer people than explosives. Yet as the anthrax attacks in 2001 demonstrated, they can instill fear throughout the country. A constant message that reinforces the limited damage of these weapons would offset their psychological power. As they fight misperceptions about the risk of terrorism, U.S. leaders should also focus on building societal resilience.

#### **American Muslims: Our Biggest Ally**

Currently, the United States enjoys an overwhelming advantage in the war on terrorism: a supportive American Muslim community. The European experience demonstrates the problems that can arise if resident Muslims are discontent. Unlike in Europe, the Muslim community in the United States is not a fertile ground for radicalism. The 9/11 attacks were carried out by infiltrators from abroad, not home-grown terrorists. Many American Muslims are educated professionals who are well integrated into American society. Often, they have higher average incomes than do non-Muslims. Polls taken shortly after 9/11 indicated that the vast majority see U.S. efforts after 9/11 as directed against terrorism, not Islam.<sup>8</sup> The various plots uncovered since 9/11 have all involved small, disconnected groups and individuals rather than a larger, country-wide network. Several appear to have been discovered with information volunteered from the local Muslim community.

But American Muslim suspicions of the government are growing. Because of measures taken to interview Arab-Americans and to fingerprint and photograph immigrant men, many in this community believes they are being unfairly harassed. Efforts to monitor nongovernmental organizations that may have links to terrorist groups have drawn criticism for interfering with Muslims' religious obligation to contribute to charity.

These perceptions have made it difficult for police to increase trust between the community and local authorities. As one police officer lamented: "Suppose I get a call about suspicious activity. I have to respond, even if it's based on prejudice. If I show up, the Arab American feels he is being profiled and trusts the police less. If I don't show up, I get an angry call or complain that I am not doing my job. It's a lose-lose situation."<sup>9</sup> These suspicions can severely hamper counterterrorism efforts. In the worst case scenario, they could inspire Muslims to turn violent. But more likely and more important, the Muslim American communities might present an obstacle rather than an asset to domestic intelligence. As one police officer noted: "We can't afford to alienate them. Otherwise, we cut off our sources of information."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *Next Attack* (New York: Owl Books, 2005), p. 119; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller, *Law Enforcement & Arab American Community Relations After September 11, 2001*, p. 6; Muslims in the American Public Square, "American Muslim Poll 2004," October 2004, 10.

<sup>9</sup> Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller, *Law Enforcement & Arab American Community Relations After September 11, 2001*, p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

To improve ties to the community, several obvious steps should be taken. These range from promoting cultural awareness among the ranks of the FBI and police to being more available to community leaders who wish to communicate their concerns. Police officers and the FBI should strive to work with community leaders, particularly the leaders of the religious community.

Before new counterterrorism measures are announced, we should consider how these measures will be perceived in the Muslim community. When possible, measures should be designed in consultation with local communities and implemented with their cooperation. Short-term and tactical benefits of tactics such as increased fingerprinting of immigrants must be weighed carefully against the possible negative externalities of these efforts. In the end, a supportive and loyal Muslim American community is far more valuable for counterterrorism than any particular piece of intelligence or law enforcement tool.

#### **IV. Improving Information Operations**

Since 9/11, the United States has expanded its public diplomacy to win support for U.S. policies. In an attempt to reach a young audience, the United States has created an Arabic language rock-and-roll radio station (Radio Sawa) and a satellite news station (al-Hurra). Both try to advance a more balanced picture of the news than local media outlets. In addition, through official trips and appearances on regional media such as the satellite news station Al Jazeera, U.S. officials try to explain controversial U.S. policies to skeptical audiences. The response to the U.S. effort has been tepid at best. Images of the Palestinian intifada, devastation in Iraq, and the testimony of poor treatment of Muslims who have visited America easily overshadow these well-intentioned efforts.<sup>11</sup>

The salafi jihadists are far more aggressive, creative, and visceral in their approach to propaganda than the United States. They post vivid images on the internet, deliver fiery sermons in mosques, and spread their message of destruction through word of mouth. Not surprisingly, study after study finds that the United States is losing the war of ideas to the salafi jihadists.

In contrast to al-Qa'ida, we do not integrate the war of ideas into our actual policy decisions. In the highest echelons of the National Security Council or other top decision making bodies, there is no post dedicated to winning over hearts and minds of our friends and our enemies. The closest position is the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. But this person has to compete with a wide range of diplomatic concerns within the State Department, to say nothing of the rest of the national security bureaucracy. American policy is thus shaped without consideration of how people around the world are likely to perceive it. Rather than consider worldwide reaction before a policy decision is made, diplomats try afterwards to spin the issue in a way that reflects favorably on the United States. The unfortunate result is that the United States fails to take advantage of opportunities to present itself in a positive light.

An obvious first step is to recognize that U.S. relief efforts in the Muslim world have a strategic as well as a humanitarian purpose. Responding to the Tsunami's

<sup>11</sup> Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds? Perspectives on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies," Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution working paper, Washington, DC (September 2005), p. 3.

devastation in Indonesia or that of an earthquake in Pakistan wins friends and counters negative perceptions of the United States from doing the right thing. We cannot anticipate any particular disaster, but as natural disasters occur regularly we can plan to quickly seize upon the next one to show that America's heart is in the right place.

Another way to win over key audiences is to woo non-violent Islamists as well as business leaders and media figures. This goal may seem obvious, but it is exceptionally difficult to implement. We cannot assume that "you're either with us or against us." The reality is that if you are not with the United States, you are not necessarily with the salafi jihadists. Some Muslims may dislike the United States because of its policies in Iraq and support for Israel; others might abhor U.S. social policies and support for area despots. AEven so, it does not mean Muslims want salafi jihadists in their midst. Reaching out to these audiences may involve bringing these people to the United States for trips and tours, thus increasing their interaction with U.S. officials. A Heritage Foundation report sensibly recommends increasing scholarships to future elites as a way of shaping the next generation.<sup>12</sup>

The United States should be realistic about the possible outcome of such outreach efforts. Rather than expect these officials to become friendly to the United States, we should assume that, at best, they will be more willing to support their local governments against the salafi jihadists, and less likely to view those who use violence as a necessary evil. If the Islamists and other elites themselves were to meet occasionally with U.S. officials or if they were to visit the United States periodically, local governments' ties to the United States would no longer be seen as a blanket endorsement of U.S. policies. But, to gain more traction with these audiences, the United States would have to make policy concessions – something it so far has been loathe to do, often for good reasons.

#### **Going Negative**

Even more important than reaching out to non-violent Islamists is changing the terms of the debate in the Middle East. Rather than focus on supposed U.S. crimes, the debate should center on the very real brutalities of the salafi jihadists. The United States can highlight the victims of terrorism, particularly those who are Arabs, Muslims, or children. For the moderates and even some extremists, no matter how noble a cause al-Qa'ida claims to represent, these victims are off limits. Governments such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Algeria have conducted successful information programs that have discredited the salafi jihadists with many domestic audiences, which often oppose specifics of the salafi jihadists' agenda and worry about violence and social chaos.

Washington and its allies should also play up the salafi jihadists' aversion to traditional Islamic practices. Salafis oppose all forms of syncretism and what they see as idol worship. Salafi jihadists take this aversion one step further and often declare more spiritual tendencies within Islam, such as Sufi movements, to be heretics. They may also desecrate graves and shrines, believing them to be idol worship. In Pakistan, salafist groups have often alienated other Muslims by their extreme stands. Because folk customs are widely practiced in the Islamic world, highlighting this hostility will decrease support for the radicals.

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<sup>12</sup> Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, "How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, April 23, 2003, 3.

Initially these measures will have only a limited effect on the salafi jihadists. Over time, however, recruits and funds will diminish, and communities will be more likely to lend a hand to the police than provide a hiding place for terrorists.

#### **Bureaucratic Changes**

To better wage the war of ideas, the United States should undertake a series of bureaucratic changes. One shift is to elevate voices for public diplomacy in parts of the government beyond the State Department. Rather than force diplomats to work with policy after it has been formulated, the policy's effects on the Muslim street should be considered before is drafted. But while public diplomacy must be integrated at the national level, much of the actual ideas and implementation should be done at the local level. Embassy officials in particular are well-positioned to determine what messages will and will not work in their country: what plays in Morocco may not play in Indonesia.

#### **V. Diplomacy**

International cooperation is vital to the war on terrorism. Whether we bomb Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan, work with Thailand to capture local al-Qa'ida members, or press the United Arab Emirates to halt its citizens' financial support for salafi jihadists, all efforts require assistance from allied governments.

For the purpose of effective counterterrorism, the United States must restructure its foreign policy to make new alliances possible and strengthen old ones. The most important thing the United States can do is identify and court new partners. For the purposes of the war on terrorism, our list of key allies should shift. Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey remain high on the list of essential allies, just as they were during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras. Now that the U.S. focus is on al-Qa'ida and the broader salafi jihadist movement, China, Japan, and South Korea are lower on the list, though they remain vital for non-terrorism issues. Several new countries have emerged. Before 9/11, Afghanistan, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen were not considered allies (and Afghanistan, of course, was an enemy). Now they join the list of countries essential to fighting terrorism. The most important new partners are India, Indonesia, Iraq, and Pakistan, all of which are at the center of the struggle against terrorism.

In only a few of these countries does the United States have embassies large enough to reach out to all important government agencies, develop contacts among local elites, and woo the broader population. Both the money and personnel devoted to these countries should be increased. In addition, the United States must improve its reach outside the capital, working with local officials and elites and developing a better intelligence base in remote parts of the country.

Given the vital role allies play, improved intelligence sharing is essential for success against terrorists. But because intelligence is easily compromised, agencies generally oppose sharing sensitive information with multiple partners. Unfortunately, information sharing with allies reflects a Cold War counterintelligence environment in which a highly skilled adversary sought to exploit any weakness. Not surprisingly, the United States has moved fitfully on intelligence sharing even though Washington has greatly expanded the number of partnerships and the volume of information exchanged. Al-Qa'ida too is skilled, but its counterintelligence capabilities are a shadow of the Soviet Union's. Perhaps more important, al-Qa'ida is likely to

exploit information gained from public sources—newspaper articles and court records. Information sharing procedures should be loosened to reflect this different counterintelligence environment—in contrast to the past, guarding against a spy among our ranks is less important than ensuring that critical information does not leak from careless or politicized officials.

To ensure the quality of the intelligence that the allies provide, counterintelligence against allied security services is vital. Washington must be sure that allies are on board and that the information being passed to Washington is complete and accurate. It is vital for the United States to know if allied services are withholding information or, even worse, if they have been penetrated by al-Qa'ida.

#### **A Better Debate**

Many of the most sensitive issues for counterterrorism today—renditions, expanded wiretapping authority, new judicial procedures, targeted killings, and so on—lie in the gray area between the rule of law and the nation's security. The merit of these measures depends not only on an objective determination of the threat, but also on how much Americans are willing to sacrifice: a political rather than policy question. An honest debate would serve our country well, and thus I particularly welcome hearings like these, even though the subject matter is grim.

To succeed in the long-term, counterterrorism policies must be politically viable for decades. I do not know who will win the presidential election in 2008, let alone in the years to come, but I do know that in the next 25 years the United States is likely to have both conservative and liberal leaders. Policies that sway with the political winds of the day will suffer from inevitable beginners' mistakes and transition costs. Moreover, those who implement them will be hesitant as they will correctly fear that they may be hung out to dry should political circumstances shift. As a result, policy should rest on a large degree of consensus and on well-informed and unbiased debate, even though this will be difficult to forge in today's political environment.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I want to thank all of you, I think those remarks were very enlightening and helpful to us.

I am going to start the rounds of questioning, we will do 5 minutes, and we may go more than one round, as long as the witnesses have time to accommodate.

Colonel Meese, the battle against Communism was an existential threat to the United States. Do you see this terrorist situation as the same type of existential or a non-existential threat?

Colonel MEESE. I think it is both. And in fact, the actual attacks that take place, whether it is Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Qaeda operating out of bases in Pakistan or others, can reinforce the kinds of existential threat and ideological threat and garner greater support for particular actions taken and get more recruits, more funding, more finances. Al Qaeda exploits the kind of information, and I think that Dr. Byman's comments are exactly right on, they reinforce each other. Unless you go on the offensive, both in an information way as well as in a military operations, capture and kill those that are actually taking the terrorist acts, you lose half of the battle there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for that.

Dr. Rabasa, I was listening to your remarks and thinking about the different types of areas that need to be reclaimed. The policymakers at West Point, they argue that the strategic focus should not be aimed at prevention of ungoverned spaces, but rather denial of the benefit. Here is what they said: "the massive troop deployment in Iraq has so far denied terrorists the use of that country as a staging ground for attacks in the West. Meanwhile, terrorists are denied the benefits of a potential Afghan security vacuum with 18,000 troops, while the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa denies jihadists the use of Somalia and the rest of that region with only 1,600 troops. In both cases, these deployments are far less resource-intensive than would be required to actually end the security vacuum."

Do you think that the United States is actually taking these issues as they come up in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Sudan, or in Algiers, and looking into finding—right now—as to what type of area are we looking at and what is our strategy for that area, or do you think we are still engaged in a one size fits all or just a totally reactive situation?

Mr. RABASA. Mr. Chairman, first let me say that I agree that denial of access and of the use of ungoverned territories definitely should be a key priority. In fact, our approach, the approach that we proposed, has two prongs, as I mentioned, one to help states and governments in establishing control. The territory might not be contested by jihadists, as in the case of the Colombian government, for example. Nevertheless we should, for other U.S. security reasons, support them in establishing control.

The second part of the approach is to deny the jihadists the use of these territories for their own purposes. So we agree with the Counter-terrorism Center with that regard.

We think that the root of the problem, from the standpoint of U.S. security policy, is that our planning documents, the strategic planning guidance, the security corporation guidance, for example, address certain specific issues, such as terrorism, international

crimes, narcotics and so on. But they do not address the problem of ungoverned territories, which are the source of these other problems that are addressed by our policies.

I think you mentioned earlier the need to drain the swamp. I think that is a great metaphor. We cannot try to kill the mosquitos, we need to drain the swamp in order to resolve the problem. So what we think needs to be done, and it hasn't been done in our policy planning process, is to make the problem of ungoverned territories, especially those that can be exploited by terrorists, a specific category of security problems that should be addressed specifically in the context of developing the force structure that is necessary to address these issues, the problems generated by ungoverned territories, the type of capabilities, for instance, the cultural sensitivity and language skills among U.S. Government agencies, so we can develop effective, comprehensive approaches to the problem.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Dr. Byman, let me ask you a question. You talked about going negative, so to speak, on the Salafi jihadists. I think that sounds entirely reasonable. How do we break into their networks? How do we do that in a way that gets to the people we are trying to reach? I always think that is the toughest part about this whole Internet culture out there, you somehow have to break into it so that the network is out and the people that you want to hear your message hear it.

Mr. BYMAN. I tend to divide the audience into three audiences. One is the broader Muslim community, and they are bombarding airwaves, radio and television, works reasonably well to a degree. The second is the broader Islamist community, including the peaceful Islamist community, where there you have to be more specialized. You have to look at particular publications, you have to try to impress particular sheiks and so on.

The hardest one is the jihadist recruiting base, which are young males ages roughly 17 to 25. And there the Internet is tremendously important, especially when you are talking about Western Europe. One weakness, I think, of U.S. information operations in general is that they are TV and radio focused. I have a large number of students where the television and the radio are quaint devices to them, where everything they get is from the Internet. I think that is increasingly true around the world. We need to put a lot more effort into that.

But also, this is something that we can encourage other governments to take on as well. Usually propaganda, which is the impolite name for this, is best done locally. Because different audiences will have a different understanding of what is going to play in their area. So encouraging other governments, not only at the State level, but also at the regional level, would also be effective.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Dr. Etzioni, how do you rank or rate the U.S.' efforts so far to prioritize threats? I think you made good points on that. As I mentioned, we have been talking about that. Do you think we have an excellent chance, an excellent opportunity set up to do that? Are we not addressing it at all? Are we somewhere in between? And who is the appropriate agency, in your view, to do that?

Mr. ETZIONI. I think that is the greatest challenge we face. I believe it is a combination of appropriate committees in Congress and OMB. Because this is the place where the base piece is supposed to be prioritized and aligned, after the budget, is the tool through which we think through priorities. But given our pluralistic nature, it is just unavoidable. I am reminded of Churchill's famous line, it is the best some days, but it is also flawed; we have to be aware of the flaws so we can deal with it, as we respond to our constituencies. And I am not talking about the failures, lobbies. I am talking about people have, the people who produce helicopters really believe that if they produce more helicopters, it is going to save us, people who make sensors and so on and so on.

Where is the force which can weigh against it and say: we need to look at the overarching studies. Honestly, I do not have to run for public office, my service is to call them the way I see them. I don't see the answer. I don't see where we have that body. So to the degree that you can in any serve that, you are doing the Lord's work.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Marchant, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MARCHANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rabasa, the FATA in Pakistan is in one area where the terrorists are remaining and are likely plotting attacks, as you mentioned. Since the United States and Pakistan are going to go through a major leadership change in the next year, what would you recommend to these new leaders from both countries as to how to approach the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Mr. RABASA. Sir, you have brought up probably the most intractable problem in terms of ungoverned territories in the world today. The problem with FATA transcends the problem of administrations in the United States and Pakistan. It is an area that has been outside of the jurisdiction of the Pakistani government for decades. As you know, the FATA is an area that legally is not part of the Pakistani legal system. It has its own legal code. It was administered by the British through political agents who then cut their own deals with the local tribal leaders and this system was inherited by the Pakistanis.

So the Pakistani state never entrenched itself as an effective government in the FATA. It was very much left to the political agents and tribal leaders. What has happened there is that there has been a Talibanization of the region over the last 2 years, beginning with the agreements that President Musharraf reached with alleged tribal elders in the tribal regions, actually Taliban commanders. This agreement has really worsened the situation to a point where I see it very difficult to believe it, from a standpoint of any United States or Pakistani government. Because the agreement that was reached at the time was allegedly to permit local leaders to prevent attacks into Afghanistan by the Taliban and to prevent attacks by the Taliban into Pakistan. This in fact has not taken place. The FATA has become a platform, over the last 2 years, for attacks into Afghanistan and not only that, but it has spearheaded a process that I would call the Talibanization of the tribal regions, and even outside of the tribal regions into other areas of Pakistan. So there has been a worsening of the situation where the Pakistani govern-

ment has no control of the FATA outside of certain military installations, where the Taliban and its Al Qaeda allies have entrenched themselves.

Now, what could be done about it? I would propose the following to make the best of a very bad situation. First of all, there are two distinct elements involved in the insurgency and the situation in the FATA. There is the Taliban, which is essentially a Pashtun-based insurgency. And the Taliban itself is fractionalized. And then there is Al Qaeda, which is composed of first, an outer core around bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and their immediate followers. And also a combination of other foreign fighters, most Uzbeks and others.

I would propose that the beginning of a strategy that might at some point bring the FATA under control would be to try to separate Al Qaeda from some of its Taliban supporters. If that could be done, it might be possible then to isolate Al Qaeda the way that Al Qaeda in Iraq has been isolated. Now, this may not be possible, because Al Qaeda and the Taliban have grown very close together over the past few years. However, working with the tribal elders trying to strengthen the authority of the tribal maliks, the Pashtun leaders in Pakistan to try to separate them somehow from the Taliban and from Al Qaeda would be the beginning of an effort.

There is also a need for a greater sensitivity to local cultural and social norms. The Pakistani army, by and large, is composed of Punjabis. Punjabis are about 90 percent of the officer corps in the Pakistani army. They by and large do not speak the local language, Pashtun. They have no rapport with the local population. So there is a need to sensitize the Pakistanis to the cultural norm. I hope I am not being arrogant in saying this, but there is a need to try to establish links to buildup moderate leaders among the Pashtun tribal groups themselves. These would require a stronger military presence to try to prevent, of course, the coercion that is currently taking place in the FATA.

I would say that money alone, military resources alone will not do the job, that much more is needed than that. An integral approach that would show the people in this region that their life has been improved through the exertions of the Pakistani government to improve attitudes and to try to isolate the fanatics.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Marchant, we will have another round. I know you must have other questions as well.

Mr. Yarmuth, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all the witnesses.

I want to pursue the psychological aspect of terrorism. I am curious as to, I don't think any of us wants to fully understand what goes in a terrorist's mind, but I am curious as to what, to the extent you can, what are the metrics that terrorists use to determine whether they are successful or not? They can blow up a building or blow up a subway and so forth, and that is the physical side. But in terms of the psychological warfare that they are engaged in, what are the metrics they use? I will let anyone address it.

Colonel MEESE. We have seen from some of their writings, and in fact, our report, Cracks in the Foundation, separates the planners who actually want to do destructiveness from the propa-

gandists led by bin Laden and Zawahiri, where a lot of their measures of merit is both the destruction as well as the psychological impact of that destruction, both causing fear and reaction in the targeted audiences, whether that is in the West or in what they would describe as apostate states in the Middle East, as well as the number of additional recruits that they get, the number of additional funding that they get, the number of additional support that they get in Internet chat rooms and on forums like that. I think if they were to do measures of merit, it would be funding recruits, literally Internet hits on some 7,000 different jihadist Web sites, those kinds of things.

Mr. YARMUTH. Does anybody else want to take a crack at that?

Mr. BYMAN. I will briefly add. When the group's leaders, it varies tremendously by group and by location, some of them look at issues strategically, are they getting recruits, are they leading to a deterioration in the government and so on. But what is noticeable is that rather quickly, the struggle itself takes on its own logic within the group where yes, there is some emphasis on, are we achieving our goals, is the population going our way. But there is a strong desire for revenge that comes in as their members are killed or arrested. There is also a sense that this is what they know, this is their world, and it is hard to take them out of it. Often these groups dry up in some ways, because the core are arrested and recruiting stops, rather than the core give up in a more absolute sense.

Mr. YARMUTH. I guess a followup I intended to get to is, how important are the reactions that they see in our society to what they do, and whether that relates to the money we spend in security, the official pronouncements of Government, any way in which we might react, or any country that they are targeting might react?

Colonel MEESE. I think our reactions do matter. I think that is why Dr. Byman's comments, I also assist the Defense Science Board on IEDs, and it is managing things to the right of the blast, so to speak, of what happens after an attack in terms of perceptions management and ensuring that there is a measured and appropriate discriminate reaction to what happens, but not an overwhelming psychological frenzy as a result is particularly important. Greater information and greater understanding makes sense.

In Iraq, and I have spent 6 out of the last 12 months over in Iraq working on General Petraeus' staff, that was part of what we did after any of the blasts in Iraq, was immediately demonstrate the barbarity of these kinds of attacks, that it was in violation of Islam to attack innocent civilians, especially as they got to softer and softer targets, so that you make a blast a propaganda failure for a terrorist, in that it violates what mainstream Islam is saying, instead of a victory in that it is going against either, in this case, the Iraqi government or whatever target they happen to be isolating.

Mr. YARMUTH. I want to ask a specific question that relates to something the President said yesterday which disturbed, I think, a lot of people. The President of the United States, if he gets before a microphone and says that terrorists are planning an event that would make 9/11 pale by comparison, is that the type of reaction that terrorists might seize on as a measure of their success in provoking fear in society?

Colonel MEESE. Again, I think we have to be careful in terms of, it is important to have agencies, committees like this taking a look at the severity of things that could happen, but also making sure that the responses to that are specific and discriminate, and not feeding into the kinds of things that terrorists are doing.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Duncan, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I really wasn't going to ask any questions, since I was in other meetings and didn't get to hear the testimony. I was glancing over some of the material and I noticed in the memorandum that we were given, it says, notwithstanding the vast U.S. counter-terrorism efforts since 9/11, our intelligence community recently reported an alarming resurgence and a strengthening of Al Qaeda.

I am curious about that, because a couple of years ago, what I am wondering now, a couple of years ago I read a column by the conservative columnist Walter Williams that said, Al Qaeda had less than 3,000 members and they were mostly high school drop-outs who lived at home with their parents. Then around that same time, I saw in the National Journal an article which estimated their strength at like, I think it was 1,800. I am wondering if any of you know, were those articles way, way off? What is the situation in that regard? Are we having a big resurgence or what is the situation? Colonel Meese.

Colonel MEESE. I will take a stab at it, then I will refer to some of my other colleagues that have studied this in a lot more detail. I think what has happened is specifically, some of those articles may look at hard core individual Al Qaeda proper or Al Qaeda central senior leadership. One of the aspects of Al Qaeda in the last several years has been that it has essentially franchised and the associated movements have moved out so that whether it is Al Qaeda in Iraq, whether it is the Al Qaeda cells that were involved in the Madrid bombings in Spain, those that claim affiliation with Al Qaeda in the London bombings, July 7th and other kinds of attacks, it has been a morphing of this. Which is why, again, going back to the ideological and information aspects of the movement, it is the global brand that Al Qaeda brings that is critical to being addressed, so that global brand is not something that affiliated movements would like to claim and stamp on what they are doing, but instead would want to shy away from and their supporters would shy away from.

Mr. ETZIONI. I think one needs to take into account that these are very low-cost operations. They don't require buildings and they don't require a large number of troops to do what they did on 9/11 or to put nuclear weapons on a speedboat and drive into one of our ports and such. So if they grow only from 3,000 to 6,000, that is a lot of trouble. As one of them put it, you have to be lucky all the time, I have to be lucky just once.

In terms of the odds, the odds may be low, but a good calculation would include what the technicalists call the size of the dis-utility. In plain English, even if you have only one in a million chances to take out Chicago and you take out Chicago, it deserves our attention.

Next, I think part of the answer to the question which was raised earlier, these are really very tribal societies. When they ally themselves with a tribe or with the Taliban or any other group, they become a very serious force. So for instance, that is what is happening now in Pakistan, where they succeeded in allying themselves, after all, we won the war in Afghanistan largely because we allied ourselves with some of the tribes against the others. One of the major reasons we are doing better now in Iraq is because we have the Sunnis to work with us rather than against us.

So if you think about it in terms of not individuals, but tribal lineups, who lines up on our side and on the other side, as was just pointed out, the powers in Pakistan which border on Afghanistan, the tribes turn ever more against us and the Pakistani government, that is where the major danger lies. Technically, they may not carry an Al Qaeda postal service, but they are allies.

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask one more thing. The staff wanted me to ask what should be the roles for Pakistan and other international partners. That reminded me and gets my curiosity too, because a few weeks ago I read in the Washington Post where all of the international partners in this entire long war against terrorism, all they have contributed is \$15.4 billion and \$11 billion of that has been in the form of loans.

They are asking us to approve that much spending in 1 month. As a fiscal conservative, these figures just astound me. What would you say about that? What are going to be the roles for Pakistan and these other international partners, and are we going to start getting some more help, or do these countries feel like these threats are so, these threats are just not as huge as they are to us? What do you say about that?

Mr. ETZIONI. Pakistan [remarks off microphone] causes [inaudible] guarded. But if you imagine for a moment that they turn to the service of the Taliban [inaudible] emphasize [inaudible]. I think partly everybody looks at it and sees that the No. 1, 2 and 3 major [inaudible]. So I don't see Pakistan in the near future, it is not so much [inaudible] but it is a major source of [inaudible]. If you compare what we [inaudible] this time [inaudible] many other [inaudible] send troops [inaudible] work would be [inaudible]. You need [inaudible] compared to the [inaudible].

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.

We have a vote on the floor, it is actually just a motion to adjourn, a procedural motion on that. I am going to continue the hearing on, but Members who feel compelled to record their vote might want to take note of that. There is about 12 minutes left on that vote. We are going to proceed on here, at any rate.

Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you. I want to thank the chairman for focusing this hearing and allow us to begin the process of stepping back, and I would like to thank the witnesses, I want to thank you as well, because you obviously all have begun that process. So let me just ask a few questions.

Dr. Byman, one of the questions we have is what to do in Iraq is about the displacement of about 4 million people, 2 million internally, 2 million externally. Are there specific actions that we could

take to address that, not just from a humanitarian perspective, but from a security perspective?

Mr. BYMAN [remarks off microphone.] Sir, I have fairly strong views on this for a number of reasons. Ignoring what I feel is a serious role for [inaudible]. Refugees—

Mr. TIERNEY. Sir, is your mic on?

Mr. BYMAN. I apologize. It is on now.

Refugees can be an exceptionally destabilizing force. Right now, the Middle East is still dealing with the Palestinian refugee problem that was created 60 years ago. The Iraqi refugees, the numbers are staggering and they are going to places like Jordan and Syria that have very low capacity to deal with their own social problems let alone that of several million people. We need to have a program for our allies, in particular, to bolster their capacity to run refugee camps, and in particular to police them, to secure their borders so there aren't cross-border raids.

I would add to that, we should be encouraging our allies and doing ourselves taking in far more refugees. What you don't want are large concentrations of refugees along the border there for what could be decades. That is an exceptionally dangerous situation and through policy, and a rather generous policy, we can minimize.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much.

I want to ask each of you about Afghanistan specifically. There has been a lot of criticism about what we should have done and did we do it right and let's put that behind us. Given where we are, what is the goal that should be what we are seeking, namely right now, it appears as though we have the notion that with the proper amount of military, the proper amount of other resources, we are going to be able to build that nation into a stable society that will have then self-governance and provide security and cooperation.

Another alternative, I would think, would be to assess it from the perspective of what do we need to do there in a minimal way to protect American security and lives from further attack. Depending on how you answer that question, which we are not even asking around here, will give you a direction on your strategy. Colonel, how about you starting on that?

Colonel MEESE. Again, our expertise is not as much in terms of Afghanistan strategy, but to address the question, I think, the basic strategy is to enable the Afghan government, not ourselves, but enable the Afghan government to expand its control and its incorporation of more and more reconcilable groups that are supportive of what the Afghan central government is doing. In that sense, it helps establish and solidify, in fact, contain some of the people that are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan from having deleterious impacts within Afghanistan proper and harming our interests.

So it is really the spreading out of additional control of the Karzai government and reinforcing that. That is done in a variety of ways, through the provincial reconstruction team and other steps that have been taking place.

Mr. WELCH. Let me go to Dr. Etzioni and then Dr. Rabasa.

Mr. ETZIONI. I appreciate that, because on this issue, there is room, I guess, for different viewpoints. The very term Afghanistan is kind of misleading. We have this notion that it is a nation, and

then we project on it kind of western concept, we talk about training the police, the national police. And I need to remind us that the United States doesn't have a national police. So the notion the Afghans are going to have a viable national police, as we see from the record, is a dream.

These nations, they are created by arbitrary taking of tribes, running a line around them and saying, you are a nation now. We keep falling into this illusion where as the head of Afghanistan is jokingly called the mayor of Kabul, because he rarely dares to leave his town, and when he does walk inside Khabul, until recently he was protected only by Americans. And how he has three Afghans he can trust.

So if we would recognize that these are tribal societies, the secret has been obvious, he is working with some of the tribes, dealing with those who will not want to stop terrorism. We call them warlords, we are trying to replace them with nationally appointed Governors. That is part of this fantasy. If you stop calling them warlords for a moment and call them tribal chiefs, and recognize that they have very, very sizable armies at their command, and they provide security for their territories. For instance, they have a tradition of assigning volunteers to patrol each village, and to the degree the confrontation becomes between the Taliban and their tribe's volunteers, then you naturally get the divide you want. The Taliban become isolated or limited to one or two tribes and the rest on your side.

But earlier there was discussion of Pakistan. I asked the former head of the CIA there, there are seven tribes, it is not one tribe. And again, the notion of talking about them as if they were one group is again something we have to—we have to think tribal. Then I think we will get much closer to the reality on the ground. There are some unpleasant choices. These guys are not beautiful people and I wouldn't like to have them over for dinner or date my daughter. But initially, we have no choice but to work with them to establish elementary security. Then we can talk about all the other nice things.

Mr. WELCH. Dr. Rabasa.

Mr. RABASA. I will associate myself with what Dr. Etzioni said. In fact, it is not only seven tribes, they tend to be fragmented into sub-tribes and clans. It is very similar to the situation in Somalia, it is basically tribal societies, the tribes, the clans are the basic unit of society. So the authorities need to work with them to isolate the radical elements.

What happens is that, when the tribes and the clans perceive an external enemy, they tend to unit, which makes it very, very difficult to deal with them in the sense of using military force. So there is a great need here again for cultural understanding, really understanding how this society works, and then working with the basic units of society to isolate extremist elements.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Mr. Van Hollen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for organizing this series of hearings and thank you all for your assistance.

I think many of us in Congress were justified in being critical of President Musharraf for what is perceived to be lack of more aggressive action in the areas, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and of course, the cease-fire agreement that I think our intelligence community unanimously agreed actually had allowed for greater resurgence. But I think we focused less on the Afghanistan side, and in fact, when President Karzai and President Musharraf were here in Washington some time ago, sort of pointing fingers at each other for the problem, I think many people sided with President Karzai.

I have a question related to that, and it gets to the question many of you have raised with respect to the tribal politics in Afghanistan. There was a piece in the Washington Post Monday entitled, "Two Myths About Afghanistan." It was by Ann Marlowe, who has been a long-time freelance journalist in the area. This is that she said about one myth. The first is that Karzai is a good president who looks after American interests. And what she argues in this piece is that "It is an American illusion that Karzai is Afghanistan's bulwark against the Taliban or ethnic strife. In fact, the reverse is more likely." Her argument is that because he comes originally from the Pashtun area, which is the area of course dominated by the Taliban, that he actually has not been able to be as tough on the Taliban as we might want him to be, because he is focused on reelection. In fact, his margin of victory came from that area. In fact, he got a minority of the votes from every other area, whereas he got a majority from this particular region.

So my question, and I don't have an assessment one way or another of this article, but I am interested because for so long we have sort of assumed, I think, here in Washington, that our interests have been not only aligned by Karzai, but that he has been successful, somewhat, in furthering and advancing those interests. I am interested in your assessment at this point in time as to whether or not that is being successful or not.

Mr. ETZIONI. It depends what you define as success. If you think that fair and free elections are a success, I think it was, I agree, it was moving, dramatic, to see the people of Afghanistan line up and get their fingers in ink and vote for the first time in their life in a free election. If you see the draft Constitution, it is kind of an odd creature, it is half Islamic and has some things written by advisors from the United States about human rights, and you see we have a constitution which has human rights, you get a plus.

If you think that what you need is elementary security, so people can go to work without getting killed, and that terrorists will not find a haven, you will find that he has been appointed by the West, that people have been appointed in Afghanistan for, we can argue for a 1,000 years or 900 years, by outside forces. And they get immediately discredited, because they are not of us, they have been appointed by some foreign occupying force. And you come to a rather different conclusion.

I believe that you have to have basic security before you can have a stable society. Then there is room for building a civil society

and democracy. I think Karzai cannot deliver. If you think about what he has at his command, as compared with the Dutch troops being ordered not to shoot and the German troops ordered to fight only on Mondays and concentrate themselves in the area where there is no fighting, what does he have to put against the very committed Taliban, of course, our forces. But our forces are not at his command. So he doesn't have what it takes to deliver.

I will go back to the point, we need, sadly, to look at the tribal chiefs and those who are loyal to them if you want to build a real coalition. They are not supportive of him. Given more time, I could quote you tribe by tribe by tribe, what happened to Mr. Khan as he was moved from tribal chief to Khabul to become a minister. To the degree that we are not allowing the tribes to be the major players, we are just undermining our purpose.

Mr. RABASA. I will just add that I think it is a mistake to focus too much on personalities in terms of our policies toward not only Afghanistan, also Pakistan. I don't know that anyone else would have done any better than Karzai in Afghanistan. Maybe he is the best there is.

I don't think that we should have expected that Musharraf could effectively deal with the problems in the frontier regions of Pakistan, given the limitations of his political support, so that again, if there is an answer here, it is to go beyond these individual leaders and try to help develop a social consensus in both Afghanistan and Pakistan against extremism. It is not a matter of tribes in Pakistan. Outside of the tribal areas, Pakistan is not a tribal society. It is a question of a social consensus. I think this could have been developed in the context of a democratic election. The assassination of Bhutto was a tragedy, because it really closed down an option of a popularly elected government with a substantial popular base that could have been taking effective actions against the extremists.

This is in my view the only effective response to the dynamics in these two countries.

Colonel MEESE. If I could just briefly answer, and put that article or op-ed piece in the context or the theme from this hearing, which is approaches toward terrorism. That article kind of reflects some of the problems that we have in that Karzai is either for us or he is against us. And we try to make black and white distinctions between them. What we, from my experience in Iraq and reading experiences of others in Afghanistan, there are many more shades of gray in between. And what you find is the irreconcilable elements that are on the very most extreme edge that the Taliban who subjugate women, who have forced marriages, who chop off fingers for smoking and those kinds of things, everybody will condemn, or a majority of the mainstream will be able to condemn.

And we ought to exploit that and those reconcilable elements that will not necessarily agree with 100 percent of all of the policies that we do, but will be ones that are, tribes that are in, for lack of a better term, the gray area in between, that will turn against the extreme terrorists and may not be exactly our models of Jeffersonian democracy, but are ones that we can work with. That is the kind of environment and the kind of reconcilable elements that I think we need to focus on.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

I have just a couple of questions, if you gentlemen have time on that. One is, the mention of the importance of police, even sometimes as opposed to military people, in an area like this, seems to make a lot of sense. But we don't put a lot of emphasis on that within our Department of Defense, or our State Department, or elsewhere. We don't promote people as readily if they are involved in training as they might be if they are involved in combat. Would you gentlemen or whoever feels that they want to comment on whether or not it would make sense to have some multi-national group undertake that particular mission as opposed to a particular country like the United States trying to resolve that issue?

Dr. Byman, do you want to take a stab at that?

Mr. BYMAN. I will take a first stab, at least.

There is a good and a bad to a multi-national approach. The good is that as was mentioned, the United States does not have a national police. In fact, we are not used to thinking of paramilitary forces, police that are exceptionally well armed, that are used to dealing with more than low level violence. A number of our allies around the world have forces that are equipped and have the mind set for that.

The bad though is that if it is multi-national, it is almost certainly not going to get the resources or the bureaucratic attention it deserves.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is the same problem we have with our own effort.

Mr. BYMAN. Absolutely. I would actually say even worse, where needless to say, we as a country can, if there is Presidential leadership and congressional pressure, we can push a bureaucracy in the right direction. Much harder to do with a multi-national effort.

Mr. TIERNEY. That makes sense. Thank you.

Colonel Meese, you talked in your paper about agency problems that were confronting Al Qaeda. Can you elaborate a little bit on that for me? You said Al Qaeda had agency problems that we might exploit.

Colonel MEESE. Yes. The challenges within Al Qaeda is they are similar to other organizations in that the principles that are leading Al Qaeda can't effectively monitor what the agents do. So the principal agent problems, as they are described particularly in our first Harmony report, indicates that they have the kind of levels and organization problems that can be attacked and exploited.

For example, going after finances, going after contracts that they are establishing with individuals, and interrupting their ability to monitor their fighters that are actually carrying out the policies as they are going through. For example, attacking middlemen that are transporting either supplies, material and especially money, which is extremely lucrative. There is a lot of experienced, knowledgeable, somewhat older middle people within the Al Qaeda organization that are in this for a longer period of time that are attempting to profit from it, being able to exploit their profit-oriented motives so that Al Qaeda in the long is not effective.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. [Remarks off microphone.]

Mr. ETZIONI. I am not sure exactly what ungoverned spaces are. But we sometimes talk about a failing society, so there was an ef-

fort in Bosnia to turn it around, though that was a British mandate which devoted enormous resources for 9 years to try and turn Bosnia around. But again, their image was to turn Bosnia into a British society. He wanted civil servants who were not corrupt, he wanted ethnic groups to stop fighting each other. Asherton [phonetically] had this clear notion, he brought 900 Brits there, tried to change practically every aspect of their Bosnian society. God can do it, but nobody else.

The same thing in Kosovo. We had this idea we were going to create a multi-ethnic society. My favorite short story is that one of the USAID people said, we are going to make a gun-free, dark-free society. That is something we don't have a lot of experience with. So the notion that we can go and turn Kosovo into some kind of a wonderland. So what we have to get closer to the ground, you talk about training police. We sometimes mean, people are not corrupt, or ethnically sensitive, who know the constitution by heart. There are very high standards. It is just very difficult to get people who have gone in a culture, gone back to their homes from a different culture to make such huge jumps.

So I think, to put it in a sentence, being a sociologist, if it becomes sociologically more real, I think we will have more success.

Mr. TIERNEY. It seems fairly obviously that we are not going to be able to send 160,000 troops and 180,000 contractors into every area that we think is troubled on that. So we are going to have to have a significant amount more cooperation with other countries and their background. Would you like to comment on establishing foreign liaisons, particularly in intelligence areas, and how this differs from the cold war in terms of what we can share and what we should be sharing, or should we have the same reluctance to share that our intelligence people exhibited during the cold war phase?

Colonel MEESE. I will take a couple of very quick comments on it. I think that there are some models that work. One that I think would be instructive to take a look at is the U.S. leveraging the Georgian forces that are currently in Iraq, where for a reasonable amount of security assistance funding, the Georgians have been fairly robust in terms of their support for individuals with two brigades that are currently serving on the Iranian border in Iraq and are being fairly effective in that regard.

Things like that, and having worked in Bosnia with the Guardia Nacinoal from Spain, the Caribinari, those are very effective forces and actually, from a U.S. taxpayer perspective, are probably, if there is some kind of a cost-sharing or burden-sharing arrangement, a fairly thing to use. Related to that, Bosnia is another good example in that there were national intelligence centers from each of the different countries in Bosnia that were represented in Bosnia.

So I remember taking from the U.S. national intelligence center intel that would then be able to go over to, of all places, the Romanian National Intelligence Center, and share those effectively. I think the intelligence community has done a good job with what they call in the trade, tear lines, where you can have some part above the tear line that is only releasable to certain allies, and the stuff below the tear line is releasable more and more to our intelligence agencies, can be much more widespread with the kinds of

things that can be shared with allies without divulging sensitive sources and methods. That I think is particularly important.

Mr. RABASA. Just a couple of quick comments, Mr. Chairman. I am not aware that any international organization has a comprehensive approach to ungoverned territories. But there are cases of international cooperation, especially in Africa, where there have been some Nigerian-led missions to Sierra Leone during the civil war in that country, for example. Today there is the African forces mostly from Uganda in Mogadishu, as another example.

Most of these, many of these ungoverned territories have occurred on border spaces, and border regions. In fact, that is almost universally the case, because these are generally in hospitable regions that lend themselves to the presence of insurgent groups that operate on both sides of the border. So by their very nature, a lot of the problems generated by ungoverned territories are international, which means that they call for international cooperation.

So it would make a lot of sense, and we make that recommendation in our study, first to mobilize regional organizations to the extent that is possible, for example, the African Union, the Organization of American States, etc., to play a positive role in restoring some sort of order within these territories.

Second, where international organizations are not appropriate, ad hoc coalitions could work. But this very much has to be done on an international cooperative basis.

As far as intelligence cooperation is concerned, one of the things that I have found is that some small countries have an excellent, excellent intelligence capability within their own regions. For example, I was last year in the Horn of Africa and some parts of former Somalia. I found that Djibouti on what is happening in the former Somali, maybe better than ours, as far as I could say. Singapore has very, very good sense of what is happening in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia.

So we certainly do benefit from relationship with the intelligence agencies, especially small, vulnerable strategic countries that have a larger stake in what is happening in the broader region. One of the problems that I was told, and I won't mention any country specifically, it specifically said yes, there is intelligence liaison and intelligence sharing. But sometimes we take too long in making the information available to them. So that by the time we get it, it might not be actionable.

So I was told by the chief of intelligence of a country that again, I won't mention, that please do everything you can to tell people back in Washington that try to make this information sharing more timely.

Mr. TIERNEY. That was the concern I had, was that we are still under the cold war type of mentality of not sharing it until we don't think it is relevant any more, and then sharing it all we want. It seems that terror is a different sort of animal that we are dealing with here, there shouldn't be that many bars to sharing.

Mr. Yarmuth, if you have further questions.

Mr. YARMUTH. I just have one line of questioning I want to pursue. Forgive me if it was discussed while I was over voting. But dealing specifically now with counter-terrorism in the sense of going after terrorists and stopping them, and I guess this is mostly

addressed to Colonel Meese, do we have all the skill sets that we need to effectively pursue that activity, and do we have any structural problems that you might have recommendations for as to how we might better organize our counter-terrorist activities? Anybody can answer. But I thought I would direct it to you first, Colonel.

Colonel MEESE. Probably better off talking to more senior folks in the Army staff to look at Army structural problems. But I think some of the advances that we have made, for example, there is a substantial, just for example at West Point, we have substantially expanded the language instructions so that for most of our majors, they are going from 1 year of language to 2 years of language. And thanks to support from the Congress and others, 140 cadets are spending a semester abroad out of West Point during their junior year, which had never happened before.

When I was a cadet during the cold war, we had 20 international students, and that was the total limit of international interaction that we had. We now have 60 international students that are there for 4 years. And that will change, I think, in the long run, the cultural sensitivities, the approach that individuals will take, obviously the language proficiency that they will have, having spent time in Egypt studying and in Morocco studying, in China studying, in countries of the former Soviet Union studying. That will be very helpful.

So I think structural changes, in terms of crafting the people that we will have, because I don't know what technology we will have, I don't know what organization we will have 15 years from now. But I know what Major or Lieutenant Colonel will have, because he is the cadet that I am teaching today.

Mr. RABASA. With regard to my area of concern on ungoverned territories, we do of course need different force mixes to deal with the problems generated by these areas. We do make a recommendation in our report that in addition to the useful mix of combat and combat support units that we have that what is needed is forces optimized to restore order and also for civic actions, such as civil engineers, military police, medical units capable of providing public health services, civic affairs personnel with expert, people with expertise in infrastructure, construction support personnel and so on.

And this by the way seems to be the focus of the Balikatan [phonetically] of 2008 exercise in the southern Philippines which begins on the 18th of this month, where the focus has been shifted from the usual type of combat training to the type of civic action that I just mentioned. And more of this is needed.

Mr. BYMAN. If I may chime in, one additional problem we have with our Government is that the security clearance process is broken. This is not a secret. Study after study has shown this and it has shown it for 20 years. But it still takes many people years to get in. And it is exceptionally difficult, frankly, the more you know and the more you are involved with foreign cultures, if you are from a family of immigrants and you have relatives overseas, it is going to take forever. Ironically, these are the people who would add the most, in particular, to our intelligence services but also to our diplomatic services. That is a tremendous problem.

Mr. ETZIONI. I don't know to what extent you can conduct additional sessions like this, but if you can, I would suggest that you consider having one on this idea of reconstruction. The notion that we can go into a country and—reconstruct by itself is a little bit of a complicated phrase. Because Afghanistan was never constructed. So to reconstruct it is quite a challenge.

But there is a notion, there are a variety of ideas how to do it that I don't want to go into now. But just to flag the topic that people think that they can get goodwill and win the hearts and minds by handing out candy and soccer balls, well, all you have to think about is your own firmly established beliefs and your peers and you see that this is just not going to work. We then talk about building wells and roads and such, and there's absolutely no reason a village in a part of Afghanistan will not be happy to take the well and the road. But then come the Taliban, and that will not general sufficient loyalty.

So what works and doesn't work in reconstruction deserves some really very, very serious and difficult question. We have a lot of experienced in it, but we tend to be, again, on the overly optimistic side.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

We do have some hearings coming up with respect to the reconstruction efforts, targeted for Pakistan. Questions about whether or not they could be effective, whether or not there is any accountability going to be there for the money, how it gets disbursed. We may have some assurance it actually gets to work for what is intended and what the results are on that. So it is an excellent idea. Thank you yet again.

Mr. Lynch, do you have any further questions you would like to ask?

Mr. LYNCH. I do, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thanks for your good work on these hearings. One of the things that bothers me is that when you look back, a lot of the major attacks against the United States, the 9/11 attacks obviously, but also attacks against the embassy in Dar Es Salaam and the attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, the attacks against the USS Sullivan, the attacks against the USS Cole, these were all centrally controlled and planned by Al Qaeda. They were done so at a period when they had a safe haven in Afghanistan, during that era. And now in retrospect, with all the research that has been done, we see how it took them a while to do it and that safe haven status gave them great flexibility to get these things done.

What I fear now is that we are seeing a safe haven develop in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in parts of Pakistan now. I know that the chairman and a lot of the members in this committee, including myself, have spent a lot of time up there in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, that Dr. Rabasa has talked about.

And I know, I am going to set aside the logistical problems with my question, from a military standpoint. But from a political standpoint and I guess a long-term view, what would be the consequences if we were to decide that a concentrated but a significant military intervention in Pakistan and the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas was necessary? What do you think, now, put aside the logistics for now, what would the response be politically? And like I say, in the long-term view, what would happen there? Dr. Rabasa, since you have addressed this in your remarks, perhaps you could have first crack at it.

Mr. RABASA. Yes, thank you, sir.

First, I don't believe that Al Qaeda ever lost some level of central command and control over operations overseas. Because if you looked at all of the British attacks, actual and potential, that have taken place since 2003, there is always a connection back to Pakistan.

Mr. LYNCH. Just to be clear, though, it was hands-on in the early attacks, very complicated.

Mr. RABASA. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. A bunch of guys getting on a train with a backpack and a cell in either Madrid or Mumbai or London, that didn't, in my mind and in my research, didn't reflect the type of complex planning and long-term planning that Al Qaeda engaged in in all those other attacks.

Mr. RABASA. No, not the same level of planning by any means, but some level of connectivity was always there and some level of training was always there. But you are right, not with the same complexity.

As far as the main part of your question, what would be the consequences, I believe that the consequences of a direct U.S. intervention in the tribal areas of Pakistan would be disastrous. Because Al Qaeda's strategy is really to reach down into local insurgencies and to incorporate those insurgencies into the global jihad. To the extent that they can do that, and they have done it to some extent in Pakistan, they are successful. To the extent they fail, as in Mindanao, then their strategy fails.

If we were to intervene directly in Pakistan, in my opinion, what that would do is that would enable Al Qaeda and the Taliban allies to mobilize national sentiment against us. We would be invaders in the Muslim country, it would validate their narrative [phonetically] of Muslims under attack. We would not be likely to receive much support from the local population.

So therefore, the adverse consequences of that I think are much more likely than any positive outcomes of if we were directly involved in the fighting in Afghanistan, and we had not been able to eradicate the Taliban and its Al Qaeda associates. So the struggle against this type of activity has to be done, I think, to the extent possible through indirect means by empowering local governments and moderate sectors to fight the extremists. But our own involvement, I think, would have counter-productive consequences.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Thank you.

Colonel.

Colonel MEESE. I would generally agree with that, and so consequently, then, what do you do. I think part of it is to the extent that you can, containing the influence that they have within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas by again, supporting local governments, reducing the effect that they have, impeding to the extent that it is possible working with partner governments, travel, interdicting financial flows in and out is another aspect of it, as

well as countering the ideology and the messaging that is out there in sewing seeds of dissent. Because again, as has been previously mentioned, it is not monolithic tribes. There are different subsets of those tribes. And having disagreements among themselves will probably be far more effective than doing the one thing that would unite them, which is intervening directly.

Mr. LYNCH. Dr. Byman.

Mr. BYMAN. I strongly agree with that. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, that is where good policy options go to die. There isn't really a chance of direct intervention, I think, because it will produce exactly the reaction that we want to avoid, which is bringing people together against us.

I think the best means would be to step up covert action to try to work as much as possible at the local level, recognizing that, frankly, we are lying down with dogs and there are going to be some unpleasant things that happen when we do that.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Dr. Etzioni.

Mr. ETZIONI. I very much agree with what has been said, and I will not repeat it. I just want to add a sentence. In our dealing with Pakistan, we kept emphasizing limiting terrorism and not equally limiting the distribution of nuclear weapons. So for instance, when we caught what was called the nuclear walnut, we allowed the Pakistanis to basically disregard it, giving the gentleman a kind of symbolic punishment and such. We didn't make much of an issue out of it, because we kind of tried it, curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, with more efforts in the tribal areas.

I think our priority should be exactly the opposite. Our No. 1, 2 and 3 priority should be sure that the technological know-how, the instruments of nuclear weapons are not spread from Pakistan to other places, and that the nuclear weapons in Pakistan are not going to reach in the hands of the Taliban. Everything else should be traded against it.

It doesn't take away from anything else that was said, I just wanted to add that.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more question?

Mr. TIERNEY. Certainly. Go ahead.

Mr. LYNCH. We got a chance, a number of us, to get up to Peshawar and then fly up to the northwest provinces. We met with General Khazak, who heads up that frontier corps. And he was telling us that in many cases, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in north and south Waziristan, you have some family members, same family, same tribe if you will, that were working for the frontier corps and then other members of the family actually working with Taliban and Al Qaeda. They explained to me, some of these family members, that if you work for the Pakistani government, you get paid about \$240 a month. And the pay was not consistent, it was every so often you would get paid. But the folks with the Taliban and Al Qaeda were getting about \$300 a month, and the pay was fairly regular.

Apart from the resource issue, there is the loyalty issue. It is very mixed up there, where they are playing footsie with each other. I honestly feel like Musharraf in a way is gaming us. There

is this truce and then there is not a truce, there is a war against them and then there is not a war against them. What is the best policy for us to take? I think there is a lot of duplicity here going on. I think that President Musharraf's position is very difficult, no question about it. I don't know what the hell I would do differently if I were him.

Mr. TIERNEY. The question is, what is the best policy. does somebody want to take a stab at that? Nobody?

Mr. BYMAN. I will give a view, but I suspect I may be in the minority among our group here. I think we missed an opportunity to move Musharraf aside when Bhutto had returned to Pakistan. If I were testifying 3 years ago, I would have said that standing by Musharraf is our best option, because we are getting day-to-day counter-terrorism for the most part, not ideal, but we are getting it significant, and there is a degree of stability.

Both those statements no longer hold today. Every 6 months, it seems another significant part of Pakistan is unstable. Every 6 months it seems that counter-terrorism cooperation degrades yet one more level. So to me, the benefits, if you want to call it that, of working with a dictator, are no longer there. While there is a legitimate democratic movement in Pakistan, it might be corrupt, it is not ideal, but it is legitimate.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, thank you. Doctor.

Mr. RABASA. The relationship between the Pakistani government and the other forces and the intelligence services and extremist groups in Pakistan is complicated. There are clearly links between retired general officers in the Pakistani army, the intelligence service in particular. And not only the Taliban, but a number of extremist organizations that operate very freely in Pakistan. These are Kashmiri jihadist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba, for example, they change names because they get banned and then they resurface under a different name. They maintain links with these people, so it is very difficult to know what is the real attitude, if in fact it is at all possible to determine what is the real attitude of authorities in Pakistan and within the Pakistani intelligence service and these other groups.

That makes our developing policy toward Pakistan very, very difficult, because basically I think they are straddling both sides of a fence. On the one hand, they do occasionally capture some Al Qaeda personality and hand them over. On the other hand, let me tell you a story. We did a story of the Waziristan region about 3 years ago. There were sources that we had in Waziristan and one of the sources went to the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He saw a truck with some Taliban members and the truck would come from Pakistan across the border, would take some potshots at the Afghan government groups on the hill, and then when across the border, the Pakistani border troops did not stop them.

Then he asked the people at these outposts, well, you know, what is going on? They said, well, you know, we don't have any orders to stop them. What was clear from that and many other examples, there was a policy at the time that the Pakistani government would take action against clearly Al Qaeda and foreign fighters. So that if you were an Uzbek or an Arab or a Chechyan, you were fair

game. If you were a Taliban, that was another question. So they did make that distinction. And I am not sure that the policy has changed.

Now, they have been beaten with the agreements that they made in 1995 and 1996 because they turned out to be quite counter-productive from their point of view. But there is still a great deal of ambivalence. After all, the ISI created the Taliban. This was hatched against Indian influence in Afghanistan. And those ties, I don't think, have gone away.

Mr. TIERNEY. So none of you have the complete answer here, we are all upset. [Laughter.]

Thank you for your comments on that.

Let me just wrap this up, because I want to let you gentlemen go by noon time here, and Members seem to have asked the questions. The response to Mr. Lynch's question about sending armed forces into the areas of Pakistan seems to beg the question, why do we think that would be anything less than disastrous to send U.S. forces into ungoverned areas in Afghanistan, Helmand province or other more remote areas? Why wouldn't that be just as problematic as sending them into FATA or the northwest territories?

Mr. RABASA. If I may give you a quick answer to that, of course we were in Afghanistan because of Operation Enduring Freedom. Historically we went there to fill the vacuum together with the Afghan government that had been created by the overthrow of the Taliban, and we did not have a choice.

In Pakistan, one has to keep in mind that there are two separate issues involved, they are related but separate. On the one hand, there is the problem of the frontier region, of the Pashtun, of the Taliban, others, Al Qaeda sanctuaries on the border. Then there is the problem of the trajectory of Pakistan at large. Let's not forget that the Pashtuns and the frontier region are less than 10 percent, maybe 5 percent, of the Pakistani population.

It is of great importance to what happens in Pakistan at large and if we were to intervene directly in the frontier regions of Pakistan and even if we were to be successful in seeking to eradicate the Taliban groups and extremists there, we need to think about what would the consequences be for the rest of Pakistan, which is as you mentioned, where the nuclear weapons are. The Taliban is not likely to capture these weapons. They are very well-guarded, they are dispersed.

But what happens if as a result of our intervention Pakistan becomes radicalized? At the moment, I don't see a great prospect of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan. This is not Iran, it is a very different country. If we were to intervene, I think all bets would be off. I think that would improve the chances—

Mr. TIERNEY. I don't want to cut you short, but I think we all understood that. The question really was, though, how do you distinguish from not using troops in Afghanistan? If it is not a good idea to use them in areas like that in Pakistan, then what is the distinction with Afghanistan?

Mr. RABASA. We are there of course with the permission of the Afghan government. Although if you were to ask me, I think that

we should have let the Afghans themselves restore control in their country after Operation Enduring Freedom.

Colonel MEESE. Just very briefly, I would say the costs are higher because we have already had the negative reaction there. And to whatever extent the unification of the Afghans against us has already taken place, the costs are relatively lower. The benefits are higher in that we have a relationship with the Afghan government, and I would presume that depending upon the situation it would be in that context that we would be deploying.

And we would also be deploying force in conjunction with the other elements of power that are already there, coordinated by the provincial reconstruction teams. So that would be three distinctions that I would immediately see.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I want to thank all of you gentlemen, I know we took up a lot more of your time than you probably had figured on. We benefited greatly from it.

Mr. Platts, these gentlemen have been here for 2 hours now. Would you like to ask a 1-minute question of them?

Mr. PLATTS. Not a question. I just want to thank them for the written testimony and for coming to be with us today. Mr. Chairman, my apologies, I could not be here with you.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is fine. All of your written statements, by the way, will be admitted into the record by unanimous consent. So thank you all once again very much for all that you have helped us with and continue your good work, please.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

