

**Statement of John F. Tierney
Chairman**

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

**“Iran: Reality, Options, and Consequences. Part 2 -
Negotiating with the Iranians: Missed Opportunities and
Paths Forward”**

November 7, 2007

Good afternoon, and welcome to the second in a series of hearings the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs plans to hold on U.S. foreign policy toward Iran.

In this time of saber-rattling and bellicose invective, I thought it appropriate for us to take a different approach from how most things are done in Washington, DC.

In that vein, we are undertaking a thoughtful and comprehensive study of the Iranian people and their society; the recent history of U.S. / Iran diplomacy (and what lessons can be learned from those negotiations); and the possible options for dealing with Iran, along with the consequences of those options.

And my hope and goal is to undertake this deliberative study before any irreversible decisions are made. In other words, Congress needs to do everything it can to inform itself about all aspects of Iran before it's too late.

Today's hearing is titled, “*Negotiating with the Iranians: Missed Opportunities and Paths Forward.*”

Most people are aware the United States has had no official relations with Iran since the Islamic Republic was founded in 1979. We have imposed unilateral and multilateral economic, trade, and technological sanctions. We have designated Iran a sponsor of terror.

However – and unbeknownst to most Americans – there have been numerous attempts to maintain contact and dialogue with Iran by every Administration, regardless of political party, since relations officially broke some 30 years ago.

We have before us today a terrific panel of witnesses who can help pull back the curtain and share with the Congress and with the American people what happened in these negotiations. We have top former diplomats, National Security Council officials,

and State Department experts – the very people who personally negotiated with the Iranians; witnesses who can share their direct experiences and insights.

I believe this unique and unparalleled history lesson will be incredibly useful, in particular by offering lessons to learn from as we move forward in dealing with Iran.

Some of the general outlines of what occurred are known, but much of what transpired has remained shrouded in secrecy. Our hearing today aims to lay out this historical record and these historical lessons.

We'll explore the relations between the U.S. and Iran just prior to September 11, 2001. We'll hear from those negotiating with Iran after 9/11 and of the cooperation that Iran provided in the effort to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan.

We'll also examine whether there were missed opportunities along with the way to make progress on broader issues of contention between the U.S. and Iran:

- For example, what effect did President Bush's 2002 labeling of Iran as part of the "axis of evil" have on Iranian cooperation and willingness to negotiate?
- Why did the Administration not react positively to entreaties by the Iranians to make progress on broader diplomatic efforts in the wake of the Afghanistan cooperation?
- And what's the significance of the May 2003 fax that the Iranians reportedly sent through third-party intermediaries offering to put a whole host of issues on the table – an offer the Bush Administration apparently refused to even acknowledge?

As Chairman of an Oversight Subcommittee of the United States Congress, I also want to make sure that we perform our Constitutional duty to educate ourselves on policy alternatives and to fully consider the short- and long-term consequences of any decisions we and the Administration may make in the coming months.

Our relationship with Iran is complex, to say the least, and involves a multitude of security, economic, and diplomatic facets. While we have many serious concerns with Iran, including its nuclear enrichment program and its relations with certain Iraqi militia groups, there are also many areas where we have common interests.

The question now is how best to go forward. The Administration appears to be rattling the sabers at the same time it has put conditions before any broader talks with Iraq can commence. We'll hear from our panelists today what the lessons of this recent history tell us about whether this is the best course forward and about other diplomatic alternatives.

Realistic, hard-nosed diplomacy helped end the Cold War, stop Libya's nuclear ambitions, and has even led to some progress with North Korea, a country that has already exploded a nuclear weapon.

If the Berlin Wall could fall and the Cold War could end without World War III, my hope is that the same will be able to be said with respect to our policy towards Iran five or ten years from now.

Thank you, and I now yield to the Rep. Shays, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee.